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 This study, using historical explanatory methods, compares two cases of large-scale reform at the 
French and German post offices. First, what were the causes, patterns, and consequences of 
change in these post offices? More broadly, how can their patterns of reform shed light on 
administrative reform? These research questions arise not only from particular organizational 
realities (financial losses and technological change), but also from shifts in administrative to 
managerial styles within these organizations, a growing market emphasis, and the rise of New 
Public Management (NPM). As markets were presumed to be good, privatization (and its 
business-like components) became an acceptable vehicle of reform; where privatization was not 
feasible, corporatization was. Here I seek to better understand how the NPM zeitgeist and its 
related influences led to reform in the two cases (the French post office’s corporatization and the 
German post office’s partial privatization). In particular, how were these ideas translated into 
action within the organizations? Finally, I compare the patterns of reform constraints, methods, 
and outputs at the post offices in order to offer insights for policy-makers and public managers. 
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1.0  PROBLEM AND PURPOSE 
“Yes, in the old days that was so, but we have changed all that” (quoted in 2003, 225). Although 
written by the famous French playwright Jean-Baptiste Molière in the 17th century, the utterance 
could have been made today by the current leaders of the French and German post offices (La 
Poste and Deutsche Post, respectively). Once unwieldy and outmoded public bureaucracies, the 
post offices have undergone historic changes. La Poste is a corporatized, business-like 
organization; Deutsche Post, a corporatized and largely privatized firm, is one of the world’s 
leading logistics and express delivery companies. All told these changes have left them 
dramatically different organizations than at the start of the reform process a couple of decades 
ago. 
The reform of the French and German post offices coincides with a momentous wave of 
public management reform, led by New Public Management (NPM). As the single largest 
influence on public sector reform in OECD countries over the past three decades, NPM is 
impossible to ignore. Its emphasis on the market (privatization and personnel management), 
organizational autonomy, managerial power, performance, and depoliticization helped create a 
reform zeitgeist that ultimately spread beyond the industrialized West. Yet NPM’s rhetoric and 
ideas for reform affected some countries differently than others (Christensen and Lægreid 2013). 
New Zealand or the United Kingdom, for instance, saw reform that more closely tracked NPM’s 
core than did France and Germany (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). 
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1.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
In this study, I employ a comparative conceptual framework that centers on examining the 
French and German post offices through the lens of New Public Management. Using a historical 
explanatory approach (Van Evera 1997), I identify the elements at the post offices that led to 
change during the reform processes. Then, I draw larger conclusions about the consequences of 
this change for the organizations. In other words, I look at how NPM’s ideas were translated into 
action within the two organizations in an effort to understand public sector reform in practice. 
NPM in France perhaps did not overtly take form until the mid-2000s. Nonetheless, NPM 
elements infused reform in the country during the 1980s and 1990s, particularly through market-
based approaches, business-like management, and a quality focus. In Germany, on the other 
hand, NPM appeared mainly at the local and regional levels, although market-based ideas of 
privatization and corporatization also touched federal reforms, including in the former East 
Germany and at state-owned enterprises. Given the particular French and German reform 
contexts, as well as the larger backdrop of NPM, my research questions are two-fold. First, what 
were the causes, patterns, and consequences of change in the post offices? Second, and more 
broadly, how can their patterns of reform shed light on administrative reform? I compare the 
patterns of reform constraints, methods, and outputs at the post offices in order to offer insights 
for policy-makers and public managers. Ultimately, the patterns of change at the French and 
German post offices can help inform administrative reform debates. 
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1.2 DELIMITATIONS 
As implied through the conceptual framework, this study is not theory-generating. Rather, it is 
centered on examining contemporary historical developments in practice, grounded in NPM 
theory, to shed light on the broader phenomenon of public sector reform. Van Evera (1997, 93) 
calls this “theory-applying,” but in fact the approach is a familiar one to scholars of public 
administration. Public administration, particularly comparative public administration (Jreisat 
2002), has long been a place to bridge practice and the academy to improve public governing and 
governance; it is a distinction that has historically separated public administration from political 
science all the way back to the time of Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) early writings, but also in the 
spirit of later theorists such as Dwight Waldo. Waldo viewed public administration as “an 
applied, interdisciplinary field of professional practice” (Frederickson 1999, 5). In this vein, my 
study looks at two largely successful examples of reform to understand how developments on the 
ground can help in understanding the practical implications of public sector reform. 
1.3 CHOICE OF POST OFFICES AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Why the choice of the post offices as the focus of the study? As two of the biggest and 
historically important institutions in France and Germany—and given their momentous programs 
of reform and change—the post offices provide a backdrop with which to examine how NPM 
was translated into reforms in national contexts for several reasons. With deeply-rooted pasts, 
rich cultural legacies, and historic roles as communications channels between states, 
communities, and citizens, the post offices are inherently interesting institutions. 
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Second, from the vantage of studying changes in public organizations the choice of the 
post offices is highly pertinent. This is because they were traditionally Weberian (1958 [1946]) 
in their structure (rational and hierarchical), task orientation (rule-based), and ways of doing 
things (formal). In this way, they provide convenient milieux in which to observe how the tools 
of New Public Management may have an impact on reform. NPM tools were designed in 
particular to help free organizations of the perceived constraints of traditional bureaucracies 
(Hughes 2003).) Change at the post offices thus provides a helpful “before” and “after” snapshot 
to analyze reform. 
Lastly, the postal services are “marketizeable” (Pierre 1995) and may be provisioned by 
private operators in the market like any other service. As NPM includes in its core a market-
based approach (Peters 2001), the postal services supply a helpful backdrop to explore NPM’s 
influence. All of these considerations provide grounds for the selection of the post offices and 
how their experiences permit broader conclusions about public sector reform. In more colloquial 
terms, they answer the “So what?” question: Through study of the postal reforms, key insights 
can be gleaned from the organizational dynamics of what does (and does not) work more than 
abstract theory. 
1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The study is organized around the case studies, then thematically in terms of the reform themes, 
and finally as it concerns broader insights for public sector reform. In Chapter 2, I present an 
overview of NPM and its components. The historical background for NPM’s development is 
covered, followed by an outline of NPM’s impact and influence in the French and German 
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contexts. Such understanding is critical in order to better comprehend the administrative and 
political context in which the French and German post offices operated during their major 
reforms. Although France was initially a reluctant adopter of NPM, it nonetheless shows 
important evidence of the phenomenon. Germany, on the other hand, adopted NPM mainly at the 
local levels with key exceptions such as in railways and postal services, although it employed 
market tools such as privatization post-reunification. Chapter 3 covers the study’s methodology, 
which centers on a comparative case study approach using process-tracing. 
In Chapter 4 and in Chapter 5, I examine the reform trajectory at the French post office. 
Chapter 4 covers the early period at the French post office including the creation of the budget 
annex that devoted to it, for the first time, a separate budgetary section. It also covers 
developments in telecommunications that would eventually provide a strong reason for change at 
the organization, as well as an unsuccessful effort at reform in the early 1970s. In Chapter 5, the 
build-up to the recent period of reform at the post office is covered, focusing on Postal Minister 
Paul Quilès’ ambitious and fruitful push to separate the postal from the telecommunications 
services. This break created, for the first time, two entirely separate state enterprises, paving the 
way for corporatization in the case of the post office (and corporatization and eventual partial 
privatization in the case of telecommunications). Finally, I explain (among other developments) 
the various organizational challenges, changes in leadership, and the creation of a full-fledged 
banking division. 
Beginning with a brief summary of the history of the German post office in Chapter 6, I 
describe various reforms in the contemporary period. This includes the impact of reunification 
(and combining of the western and eastern post offices), corporatization, internationalization, and 
nearly full privatization. Through a relatively short period one is able to see how a large and 
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outmoded bureaucracy was transformed into one of the world’s leading logistics and express 
mail firms. 
With Chapter 7, I identify themes of reform from the French and German post offices. 
These nine themes of center on the internationalization and Europeanization of 
telecommunications, financial pressures, new management ideas, entrepreneurial and market 
orientations, personnel management, agency-like structures, internationalization, reunification, 
and elite decision-making (including leadership). I then highlight in more detail similarities and 
dissimilarities among the two reform experiences. Finally, Chapter 8 summaries the study while 
offering broader implications for reform and future research. 
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2.0  THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
New Public Management’s (NPM) emphasis on the market (privatization and personnel 
management), organizational autonomy, managerial power, performance, and depoliticization 
helped create a reform zeitgeist that ultimately spread beyond the industrialized West. Yet 
NPM’s rhetoric and ideas for reform affected some countries differently than others. New 
Zealand or the United Kingdom, for instance, saw reform that more closely tracked NPM’s core 
than did France or Germany. More important than abstractly measuring conformity to NPM 
country-by-country, however, is to examine how NPM was interpreted in national contexts on 
the ground: in practice, in other words. In this chapter I briefly situate NPM in larger socio-
economic developments, detail NPM’s major components, and then examine the NPM 
experience in France and Germany. This approach will allow me in following chapters to study 
the particular reform strategies employed by reformers at the French and German post offices, 
thus shedding light on these two large-scale reform experiences and their relationship to the 
larger NPM push. 
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2.1 NEW PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND ITS FEATURES 
Public bureaucracies have conventionally been characterized as Weberian (1958 [1946]): formal, 
rational, rule-based, hierarchical, and specialized (Heady 2001). From the 1970s on, however, 
this prototypical structure of a bureaucracy came under multiple strains: economically, 
ideationally, and pragmatically. Economically, many industrialized states felt budget pressures 
from slowing economic growth, increasing expenditures, and declining competitiveness (Caiden 
1991, Toonen 2001, OECD 1993). On another front, market-centered ideas about the public 
sector, its place, and its role in providing services spawned more critical views of the 
bureaucracy and nurtured a neoclassical economics and neoliberalism. Pragmatically, policy-
makers, along with business consultants and academics, began to broaden the range of reform 
tools by devising and experimenting with organizational change strategies to shake up public 
administration. Taken together, these broad factors help provide the contextual backdrop for the 
emergence of New Public Management (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, Hood 1989). 
Initial NPM adopters came in the late 1970s and early 1980s from New Zealand, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, and (with another accentuation) the United States (Hood 
1989). These countries sought new ways to improve public administration and their reforms in 
many ways became the NPM archetypes. By the late-1980s and early-1990s countries in 
continental Europe, North America, and Scandinavia were also adopting NPM reform programs, 
prodded along by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Public 
Management Committee (OECD 1995). By the mid- to late-1990s, NPM spread to 
industrializing regions including Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The World Bank, the 
International Monetary Fund, and others emphasized NPM components as part of structural 
adjustment and reform policies. At the end of the decade some argued that the public sector was 
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not merely experiencing deep change, but that a “global management revolution” was in fact 
underway (Kettl 2000). 
Given this international diffusion of NPM ideas and practices, what is NPM and what are 
its basic characteristics? Most commonly, New Public Management refers to a business-like 
management, a quality or service orientation, and the use of market tools in a public organization 
(Kickert 1997). Beyond these, NPM stresses greater organizational autonomy, managerial power, 
and depoliticization (Christensen and Lægreid 2013, Hood 1991). NPM thus serves as an 
alternative to the traditional Weberian bureaucratic structure that is largely focused on task 
completion. Whereas the traditional bureaucracy was standardized, regimented, or routinized, 
NPM’s managerial structure might be more heterogeneous, flexible, or adaptable. As 
understanding NPM’s core features is critical in evaluating public sector reforms, I turn to them 
next. 
2.1.1 Market 
Under NPM, the assumption is that markets, not states, lead to the most efficient and cost-
effective delivery of services. In the public sector, this is through the use of market-based 
incentives. Proponents of this view argue that markets provide a superior outcome (in quality and 
employment of limited resources) through competitive arrangements (Peters 1996). 
Consequently, by subjecting bureaucracies to the rigors of market-based competition in the 
provision of public services it is thought that the supply incentives of bureaucracies will better 
align with public demand for services. The result will be more “entrepreneurial” organizations 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Osborne and Gaebler 1992). NPM has also sought to apply 
market-based incentives to public personnel. Using a similar logic, proponents have argued that 
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subjecting employees to competition and market pressures will induce them to perform more 
efficiently (Peters 2010). Ultimately, they argue, this will lead to improved quality of service 
with staff shifting from task completion (Weberian) to meeting demands and objectives (NPM). 
The market-based reform approach altered the landscape of public service provision as 
privatization brought competition to services once monopolized by the state. This occurred 
through a range of arrangements on the market-state spectrum from (for example) public-private 
partnerships, to franchising, to contracting-out. Yet whichever form privatization has taken, the 
outcome is similar: a net reduction in the role of the state in the economic production and 
utilization of resources, substituting the private for the public sector (Savas 1987, Weizsäcker, 
Young, and Finger 2005a). Moreover, market-based approaches alter the public’s relationship 
with the state by turning citizens into self-interested customers. Rather than participants in a 
shared process of governing, citizens approach public services as any other, viewing them 
through a transactional, business-like lens. This, to be sure, has important implications for 
governance (Pierre 1995). The market approach thus buttresses the demand side of public 
services (citizens-cum-customers), as well as pushing public bureaucracies to become more 
market-driven and business-like in their operations, mentality, ethos, and organizational culture. 
2.1.2 Managerial Power 
NPM proponents have frequently viewed a traditional bureaucracy as unwieldy, inefficient, and 
task-focused. As such, they criticized it for not being able to react or adapt to changing needs or 
environments (Aucoin 1988, Pollitt 1990, Barzelay 1992, Dunleavy and Hood 1994). NPM 
proponents seek to address these perceived deficiencies using managerial power, specifically 
providing public administrators (now called “managers”) with additional flexibility and freedom 
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to carry out the work with which they are tasked. “Let the managers manage” thus became a 
common exhortation from reformers; politicians were to “steer, not row” (another mantra) 
(Osborne and Gaebler 1992). In other words: provide overarching guidance, but do not intrude 
on the nitty-gritty of policy implementation.2 Reformers pushed to lift constraints on managers 
they believed impeded decision-making. They streamlined or flattened organizational 
hierarchies, simplified procedures and manuals (National Performance Review and Gore 1993), 
and gave managers added discretion to approach more problems on a case-by-case basis (rather 
than in a firmly uniform manner). Such changes reflect a convergence in many ways of private 
and public managerial practices: Business carried out many similar changes before NPM 
appeared. 
This generic or “general” management approach, highly influenced by the business world 
and its managerial culture (e.g., Peters and Waterman 1982), has less of a concern for 
conventional public concerns (Allison 1986). These concerns include equity and fairness that 
may indeed slow down decision-making and make it less efficient, but they offer nonetheless the 
public greater inclusion and representativeness (Ingraham and Pierre 2010). As such, NPM on its 
face may have improved efficiency through its lifting of bureaucratic constraints, but it may also 
have diminished democratic accountability checks over the bureaucracy (Minogue 1998). 
2.1.3 Performance Measurement and Management 
Performance measurement and management are critical to NPM (Bouckaert and Halligan 2008). 
Nonetheless the basic idea finds roots further back with the Planning, Programming, and 
2 This is also related to efforts to depoliticize the bureaucracy. 
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Budgeting System, program evaluation (OECD 1994), or Management by Objectives (Radin 
2006). Indeed, measurement metrics such as inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes parallel 
program evaluation; they focus more on the causative link between program activities and 
outcomes than does performance measurement (Hatry 2006, 1999). This said, the basic idea of a 
performance-based approach is to deliberately define overall goals, link tasks to them, and then 
measure to see if they are achieved (Ingraham and Moynihan 2001). 
Under NPM the performance approach focused initially on ex ante identification to ex 
post control (Peters 2010), moving from “soft” controls more characteristic of a Weberian 
bureaucracy to “hard” mechanisms reflective of a more market-based managerial context 
(Bouckaert and Halligan 2008, Dooren, Bouckaert, and Halligan 2010). The result is thus a 
recapturing of managerial control that was initially yielded under NPM (Peters 2010). The 
mantra of “managing for results” helps to capture this shift (Kamensky, Morales, and Abramson 
2005). Performance management, as Radin (2006) notes, has sought to encourage a continual 
and long-term process of improvement. It has also been used to make (or help) public 
organizations justify funding—or to cut them altogether. As such, she says, it can be rife with 
contradictions: Changes may not always be productive (for example, metrics employed for their 
own sake) while all-too uniform prescriptions are employed and come at the expense of equity. 
2.1.4 Organizational Autonomy 
NPM has facilitated the growth of agencies and agency-like structures. Several reasons have 
been given for increasing organizational autonomy, but the result has been to move several 
functions that previously were conducted at the central level to other entities across a number of 
OECD countries (Verhoest et al. 2011). This has facilitated public management reforms such as 
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civil service headcount reductions and the introduction of business-like orientations, yet their 
spread has also helped lead to fragmentation and coordination dilemmas in service provision. 
Agencies include governmental units or departments, state organizations with some managerial 
independence, statute-based establishments, state enterprises, lower-level governmental bodies, 
or private organizations through contracting out, for example (James and van Thiel 2013). The 
United Kingdom’s Next Steps agency is thus one example of this phenomenon (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2011), but so are the array of corporatized public enterprises. The rationale behind the 
creation of agencies has primarily been to ameliorate the principle-agent problem of delegation 
with the bureaucracy laboring under uncertainty from politicians and the political process (James 
and van Thiel 2013). 
2.1.5 Depoliticization 
NPM has sought to minimize the influence of politics on the bureaucracy, generally holding such 
pressure as interfering with the efficiency and effectiveness of the organization. Within the 
industrialized world, politicization refers to influence over policy and implementation,3 of which 
several paths to change and control exist: changing employees, changing behavior (attitudes and 
culture), changing bureaucratic structures, and changing the locus of decision-making (Peters 
and Pierre 2004). Moves to depoliticize the bureaucracy include adopting a business-like culture 
and parceling out policy implementation to other entities (for example, the United Kingdom’s 
Next Steps agency) (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011, James and van Thiel 2013). Such changes, 
3 Peters and Pierre (2004) note that the wielding of political influence over policy and implementation is the typical 
pattern in industrialized countries (rather than the more traditional definition centered on patronage appointments 
and its related implications for public personnel selection, promotions, and discipline in industrializing states).  
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however, are not without consequences; while they may indeed insulate civil servants from the 
pressures of politics, they may at the same time be shifting their public service values and 
motivations to those aligned with NPM, argue Peters and Pierre (2004). This, they suggest, may 
result in a larger democratic accountability gap between the public’s representatives and the 
bureaucracy. In this way, NPM may depoliticize certain aspects of partisan influence, but it may 
leave behind a different type of politicized influence in its place: allegiance to a market-inspired 
managerialism. 
2.2 NPM IN THE FRENCH AND GERMAN CONTEXTS 
The New Public Management zeitgeist had an impact on France and Germany, albeit to different 
degrees (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). NPM in France did not overtly take form until the mid-
2000s, but its elements infused reform during the 1980s and 1990s. This was particularly through 
market-based approaches, business-like management, and a quality focus. In Germany, on the 
other hand, NPM appeared mainly at the local and regional levels, although market-based ideas 
of privatization and corporatization also touched federal reforms, including in the former East 
Germany and at state-owned enterprises. How did the countries employ the tools of reform? 
Moreover, how did the countries’ national particularities shape (or constrain) NPM’s growth? I 
turn now to this interpretation of NPM in the French and German national contexts. 
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2.2.1 France: Historically Constrained, but Important Change over Time 
France’s relatively big (Knapp and Wright 2006) administration has largely conformed to 
Weber’s traditional bureaucratic archetype, albeit with a greater emphasis on egalitarianism 
(Mény 1988). The French bureaucracy’s administrative heritage dates to the Ancien régime, 
although it has experienced changes, particularly post-World War II. One of the most important 
changes of the time gave civil servants the right to strike. Since then, the functionary en grève 
has become a fixture of the landscape, complicating attempts at reform. Structurally, the civil 
service is organized in large, statute-based groups called corps; members of the elite corps 
graduate from prestigious training schools known as grandes écoles. The training schools, 
including the École nationale d’administration (ENA) (Bartoli 2008), play a critical role in 
populating the highest levels of the civil service, as well as contributing to a homogeneity in 
training and outlook. Finally, the French notion of service public that “associates the general 
interest, the state, the citizen and the delivery of public services” (Le Galès 2005, 123-124) adds 
an additional wrinkle to the bureaucracy’s outlines. 
The famed French sociologist Michel Crozier (1964, 1973) criticized many decades ago 
what he saw as his country’s inflexible bureaucracy. Crozier argued that its pathologies impeded 
social progress, contributing to a “stalled” society. In recent decades (from the 1980s on), France 
has been characterized as slower to adopt changes from the public management reform push 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004). Nonetheless, France has undergone important changes in its public 
sector including in the area of NPM (Rouban 1997, Bezes 2010). 
One of the primary areas where public reform ideas have infused the French public sector 
has been in the introduction of market-based and business-like strategies as governments on the 
left and right gradually jettisoned dirigisme and the state’s portfolio of national enterprises 
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(Knapp and Wright 2006). These were largely inherited from post-World War II nationalizations. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s governments turned more and more to privatization as a strategy to 
modernize public organizations including banks, electricity firms, insurers, a television 
broadcaster, and automobile and steel manufacturers (Schmidt 2001). Privatization enabled 
nationalized enterprises to convert to private entities that would mirror the structure and 
management of private business over time. It was believed that the enterprises would be more 
successful and profitable in the open market, although studies (in fact) show only mixed results 
(Finger 2005, Weizsäcker, Young, and Finger 2005a). 
In France public officials calculated that in privatization (on the one hand) many 
collective goods could be supplied under private ownership; on the other, they saw that 
enterprise sales could give the additional benefit of a (one-time) revenue boost (Wright 1994, 
Knapp and Wright 2006). The latter can be particularly lucrative in banking or insurance, for 
instance, as well as in periods of economic stress. Finally, state reformers could leverage private 
investment to reform the organizations rather than use taxpayer dollars. Privatization, however, 
is not always practical or feasible (Weizsäcker, Young, and Finger 2005b). The term itself can 
have a negative connotation in France and it may run counter to service public. Perhaps more 
critically, privatization may threaten entrenched interests. These are notably the trade unions that 
stand to lose the various perquisites and privileges in a free market. For these reasons, it is not 
surprising that reformers may push state enterprises to adopt business-like management practices 
and culture (corporatize) while remaining public in ownership. 
With the state maintaining ownership under corporatization the government could deflect 
some political heat from the unions who could otherwise charge the government with risking the 
organization’s future in the free market. At the same time, the public enterprise could gradually 
 16 
be steered towards adopting business-like practices in management and personnel (and, in 
theory, toward improving services and profitability). After all, it is hard to argue against better 
management, customer service, or higher quality standards. It thus makes sense that a process of 
corporatization could be viewed as a “middle ground” in reform (Wettenhall 2001). The 
electricity company (Electricité de France) and the railways (Société nationale des chemins de 
fers français) are examples where corporatization and public management changes have been 
implemented (Rouban 1997). 
France undertook a spate of additional reform initiatives throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 
They range from quality circles (inspired by Total Quality Management), computerization, 
updated civil service policies, bottom-up management, strategic plans, and human resources 
management (Rouban 1997). In 1989, for instance, Prime Minister Michel Rocard issued a 
circular that called for the use of objectives to modernize the bureaucracy (Guyomarch 1999). In 
the mid-1990s, additional reform documents (Prada in 1993 and Pique in 1994) built on the 
Rocard circular with Pique acknowledging the broader reform trends in Europe and the world 
(Rouban 1997). The Charter for Citizens and Public Services in 1995 would call for better 
service quality and transparency while also using performance-based criteria (Guyomarch 1999). 
Feeding into the atmosphere of change, a decentralization effort in the early 1980s moved certain 
powers to the lower levels of government that had the effect of creating more complex, but also 
more democratic governance (Mény 1988). France waited until the 2000s with the passage of a 
new financial legislation for an initiative that would be most true to the NPM model, as Bezes 
(2010) argues. This came in the Loi organique des lois de finance (LOLF) that was implemented 
in 2006. Although there were hints of NPM in the late 1990s, LOLF brought new accountability 
and performance mechanisms by, in part, strengthening the parliament’s role in the budget 
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process. It served as an entrée to further changes and is seen as “path-breaking” in its NPM-like 
reform character, says Bezes (158). 
In sum, over the past three decades France adopted important components reflective of 
the NPM reform push as it interpreted them within its national context and constraints. These 
initiatives include market-based approaches including pushing business-like management 
through corporatization, stressing a quality and performance orientation, and introducing 
performance-based budgeting controls with the LOLF. As a result, while France may have 
indeed been slower to take up the NPM flag, it now shows important elements of it that taken 
together add up to notable change and reform. 
2.2.2 Germany’s Incremental Adjustments, New Steering Model, and Reunification 
Germany, like France, is prototypically Weberian (1958 [1946]) in its bureaucratic 
structure, although it emphasizes legalism in its bureaucratic traditions (Painter and Peters 2010). 
Germany is a coordinated federal state with various competencies shared or delegated to the 
local, state, and federal levels of government (Esser 1998). Prussian heritage strongly influenced 
the bureaucracy, which was consolidated under King Wilhelm I and Prime Minister Otto von 
Bismarck. Despite experiencing multiple wars on its territory, severe economic and political 
tumult, an East-West split, and a momentous process of reunification, Germany’s bureaucracy 
has seen remarkable administrative continuity with the outlines of its bureaucratic heritage 
(König 2001). In its contemporary civil service, the training for higher level civil servants has 
traditionally been legal-centric despite a push for more civil servants of different backgrounds 
such as from business (Röber 1996). 
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Germany has been characterized by some reform efforts, as well as NPM or NPM-like 
emphases. One of the earliest NPM-like efforts at the federal level was the 1970 
Entbürokratisierung (de-bureaucratization) Commission to reform the civil service. The 
commission’s name is evocative of NPM at an early period. Other attempts at reform include the 
push by the major political parties in the late 1970s, and various budgeting, planning, or statute 
consolidation. Overall, reform has tended towards refining the Prussian bureaucracy rather than 
replacing it (Jann 1997). In the mid-1990s, the conservative-liberal coalition government 
convened a Lean State Commission4 to examine potential state reforms. Yet despite its high 
profile and “containing basically every NPM-related suggestion ever made,” it ultimately had 
little immediate impact (Fleischer and Werner 2011, 74). The traditional bureaucratic character 
of the federal institutions, with few exceptions, thus remained largely intact. 
NPM in its most pure form has had more of an impact at the local levels of government. 
The Neues Steurungsmodell (NSM) emerged in the 1990s that would be pushed by the 
association, as well as local government consultants, foundations, academics, and practitioners. 
The literal translation of NSM to “New Steering Model” evokes other New Public Management 
and NPM-like initiatives in other parts of the world such as Osborne and Gaebler’s (1992) 
mantra calling on governments to “steer, not row.” NSM piqued the interest of, and would 
receive some currency from, political parties across the spectrum as it was viewed as a way to 
strengthen public services rather than privatize them. Even unions and their political allies such 
as the Social Democrats would come to back the approach (Fleischer and Werner 2011, Reichard 
1997). In the meantime citizens raised their expectations about the quality of public services and 
would criticize those that fell short of expectations (Röber 1996), thus alluding to a more 
4 In German: Sachverständigenrat Schlanker Staat. 
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transactional public service. Eventually, however, NSM faded, leaving a mixed legacy. Its more 
negative stance towards traditional bureaucracy plus the fact that some of its strongest 
proponents such as the Bertelsmann Foundation and consultants were seen as “neo-liberal,” 
worked against it (Fleischer and Werner 2011). 
NPM failed to gain extensive traction in Germany for two main reasons according to 
Reichard (1997). First, Germany did not experience severe financial pressures that caused it to 
cut back the state as did many peer Western governments. It only began to truly face financial 
pressures after reunification in 1990, he says, when local and state governments began to 
experiment with (perceived) less costly ways to deliver public services through contracting-out 
or public-private partnerships. Second, as Germans have traditionally been supportive of a robust 
public sector, they have not contested the higher taxes often required to support robust 
administration. 
2.2.2.1 Reunification and Public Management 
Although NPM did not see wide-scale adoption across Germany, some use of market-
based tools such as privatization were nonetheless employed, most notably at reunification. After 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the government spent billions of German marks modernizing former 
East German administrations, infrastructure, and firms. The massive privatization program under 
the Treuhandanstalt’s initiative resulted in the restructuring, privatization, or break-up of 12,000 
formerly nationalized eastern firms or industrial combine monopolies over a few short years 
(Reid 2001). This privatization push was partly ideological under Chancellor Helmut Kohl and 
his Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union parties in coalition with the market-
oriented Free Democratic Party (Esser 1998). Nonetheless, aside from the heavy privatization of 
former East German industry, privatization was more generally not embraced for structural and 
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economic reasons in Germany, says Esser (1998). Germany’s federal system and the separation 
of tasks between local, state (Länder), and federal bodies make privatization more difficult. 
Second, many German officials hold an underlying faith in the social market economy; therefore, 
they often have a more skeptical stance towards privatization. Minus a few high-profile 
exceptions at the federal level (telecommunications and postal services), privatization in 
Germany have been largely “symbolic,” notes Esser (see also Finger 2005). 
In terms of reunification’s impact on public management and reform, the result is a 
surprising one. Although privatizations and restructurings in the eastern part of the country could 
have been imagined to have resulted in the public management trends of the time being 
implemented, they were not. Rather, the structures and civil service would be brought back to the 
East (Reichard 1997, König 2001). In this way, most of the public management innovations 
occurred in West Germany through the New Steering Model or through other means. 
To summarize the German public sector reform experience, then, is to highlight the early 
but limited attempts at incrementally tweaking the traditional Weberian bureaucracy. Although 
some high-profile initiatives, commissions, or reports appeared, they generally had only a 
marginal effect at the federal level (with notable exceptions such as the post office). More NPM-
like changes were seen, however, in the New Steering Model at the local and state levels. 
Officials there privatized or entered into partnerships with non-governmental entities to provide 
various municipal services. Finally, although reunification brought an ideological privatization 
push to shutter or re-work the bulk of the former East German industrial apparatus, the 
privatization push generally ended there. The former eastern German Democratic Republic was 
not a testing ground for innovations in public management. This collectively translated into 
incremental and limited public sector reform à la NPM. 
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2.3 CONCLUSION 
The New Public Management reform push has been one of the most powerful influences on 
public sector reform in recent decades. Its emphasis on the market (privatization and personnel 
management), organizational autonomy, managerial power, performance, and depoliticization 
has left its mark, in varying ways, on reform outcomes. Yet as the experiences of French and 
German public sector reform experiences show, the impact can be uneven, and different aspects 
over others are stressed depending upon national context and traditions. This last point is a 
crucial one to keep in mind in examining how NPM was interpreted by France and Germany in 
the reform of two of the largest and most traditional bureaucracies there, the post offices. 
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3.0  METHODOLOGY 
This chapter on methodology begins with an overview of the research type and a discussion of 
the method of data analysis (process-tracing). This is followed by a discussion of the sample and 
an identification of the study population. Finally, I conclude with information on the study’s 
instrumentation and a synopsis of the data collection. 
3.1 COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PROCESS-TRACING 
Comparative public administration (CPA) has many manifestations and meanings: to classify 
and make sense of administrative structures and functions across bureaucracies (Heady 2001); as 
a means to derive practical insight for public officials and practitioners (Jreisat 2002); or a 
methodological, even modest theory-generating, tool (Peters 1988). Except in helping to shed 
light on the influence of national administrative traditions on organizational change, I see CPA’s 
primary role as methodological. As its name implies, the core of CPA is comparison. 
Comparison may be across countries, across policy areas, across functions, across cases, or 
across time (Peters 1998, 1988). I used CPA in this study as a way to flesh out causal influences 
and mechanisms at organizations. In particular, I looked at comparing reform, changes, and 
administrative experiences at the two organizations to identify and deepen our understanding of 
public sector reform. 
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Complementing CPA, I employed process-tracing. Process-tracing seeks to map various 
causal processes in order to confirm or reject hypothesized explanations (Bennett 2010). It is 
akin to “detective work” and historical research (Gerring 2007, 178, also see George and Bennett 
2005) and allowed me to map the links in a correlative chain pointing to what I see as the most 
valid outcome. As Gerring notes, counterfactual arguments are crucial in process tracing: They 
illuminate developments that would otherwise remain obscured and consider what may have 
happened if a process-traced observation had not been present. 
Process-tracing is guided by a search for a conclusive piece of evidence, passing a so-
called smoking gun test, that will help to confirm or reject hypothesized explanations in a 
backwards and forwards direction (Bennett 2010). Bennett, borrowing from Van Evera (1997), 
notes that a smoking gun may establish causation; if the smoking gun is found, it can confirm a 
hypothesis. Importantly, however, the absence of a smoking gun does not exclude a particular 
explanation. Smoking guns, Bennett underlines, are sufficient (but not necessary) conditions to 
establish causation. As such, the tests lend strong credence to hypothesized explanations. 
Smoking guns, in this sense, allowed me to focus data analysis efforts on shedding light on the 
unclear parts of causation, aided by theory, in order to leverage “generally recognized priors” to 
make weak connections stronger. In the end, I was able to narrow down various hypothesized 
explanations (Gerring 2007, 184). 
Beck (2006) sees two flaws in process-tracing. First, Beck asks whether the method 
provides theoretical leverage over explaining broad phenomena or an isolated occurrence (or 
case)? He uses this point to make a broader statement against qualitative methods and case 
studies. Beck notes that while the approach allows researchers to better understand individual 
cases, case studies in his view do not effectively illuminate broader societal phenomena. This 
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point is readily refutable as qualitative methods and case studies have been shown in numerous 
cases to shed light on phenomena that add up to a far deeper understanding of the world (Stake 
2000, Yin 2003, 1984). Although generalization may be problematic, case studies allow scholars 
to use the results to compare across other cases and help to draw conclusions based on context 
(Gray 2009, Dey 1993). Beck’s criticism against process tracing and qualitative methods is, in 
this way, a flawed one. 
Second, Beck (2006) is skeptical as to whether process-tracing serves as an observation 
of causal processes. Beck argues that process-tracing is merely another name for descriptive 
(instead of causal) inference, referencing King, Keohane, and Verba (1994). Here Beck offers a 
potentially more serious charge: Process-tracing allows researchers to identify plausible 
inferences based on theoretical insight or presuppositions, but it does not serve as sufficient 
grounds for causation. In Beck’s view, process-tracing thus would not support (or refute) 
hypothesized explanations. Unfortunately, Beck’s charge is again misplaced. Although process-
tracing cannot definitively rule out various explanations,5 it can nevertheless add strong support 
through its robust evidence-gathering. In addition, the use of empirical tests such as the smoking 
gun can serve to strongly support or refute hypothesized explanations. This, to be sure, goes far 
beyond the descriptive inference Beck describes; process tracing provides an effective and 
methodologically sound approach to qualitative data analysis. 
5 Even process-tracing can be fallible, admits Bennett (2010). 
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3.2 POPULATION, SAMPLE, AND SUBJECT DEMOGRAPHICS 
The study’s population consisted of upper-level (present and past) management of the French 
and German post offices. At the outset of the major reforms, the organizations were two 
historically significant organizations similar in their traditional Weberian structure and in their 
“marketizeable” services. Despite the daunting challenges, the organizations nevertheless 
implemented aggressive programs of reform and restructuring, and succeeded on the whole. 
The sample consisted of a non-random, purposive sample of current and former members 
of the organizations. I gleaned additional information for the sample through a convenience and 
snowball sample of related and affiliated representatives of the government, unions, industry, 
and non-governmental organizations in order to provide additional depth and background for the 
cases. A purposive sample is based on identifying traits of individuals and employing these traits 
in selecting the individuals for sample inclusion, which may in the end produce a cross-section of 
the population (Gray 2009). The focus, then, turns to individuals who can provide useful 
information in order to flesh out the cases (see Patton 2002). 
I used an organizational chart (current and former ones, where available) to identify 
informants based on job position, function, and department. In keeping with the top-down focus 
on change, the sample focused on upper-level management. After having interviewed the 
selected informants, I interviewed still more individuals when I was provided with suggestions 
for further interviews. In other words, I followed up my purposive sample through a snowball 
approach (Davenport and Prusak 1998, see also Northrop and Arsneault 2008, Johnson 2002). 
The results of this sampling yielded 36 interviews consisting of a wide range of 
informants with intimate knowledge of the two organizations (see Appendix A). Most interviews 
were of current and former senior managers at La Poste and Deutsche Post. These included 
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division heads, subsidiary heads, directors, personnel chiefs, and presidents or CEOs. With few 
exceptions, participants were male (largely reflecting the organization’s demographic makeup in 
the senior ranks), middle-aged, or close to (or in) retirement. The bulk of the participants spent 
all or a large amount of their entire professional careers at one of the two post offices. I also 
interviewed agency regulators, finance and economics ministry officials, as well as an analyst. In 
this case, there was more diversity in gender with a mix of male and female informants. Usually 
they were in mid-to-senior career positions; there was also more diversity of organizational 
backgrounds, although they tilted heavily toward the postal sector. Finally, some of the key 
interviews were of various former French and German ministry officials, usually at the highest or 
near-highest level. These were usually senior, male, and in retirement. 
3.3 INSTRUMENTATION AND DATA COLLECTION 
Instrumentation consisted of a semi-structured questionnaire designed for each organization, but 
highly similar in its fundamentals (see Appendix B). A semi-structured questionnaire protocol is 
common in public administration research similar to this (for example, Driscoll and Morris 2001, 
Schein 1985). In addition to their widespread use in this form of research, it is appropriate for 
additional reasons. First, with the need to conduct comparisons both within and across the two 
organizations some standardized data was helpful for the data analysis. Standardization in the 
questionnaire’s structure allowed me to understand, for example, how organizational change 
affected one case and not the other. In other words, the technique permitted comparison and 
some quantitative response tallying while also allowing for probing of informants (Brewerton 
and Millward 2001). Second, due to the time frame and the fact that much of the change 
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occurred in the past, it would have been difficult to have interviewed members of the 
organizations who played exactly the analogous role in the other organization. In reality, some 
informants were simply too elderly or deceased, for instance. As a result, though the 
questionnaire could not be uniformly structured, it nevertheless included elements and questions 
common to both protocols. 
Data collection was primarily interviews, followed by written documentation consisting 
of newspaper reports, corporate documents, and limited recent archival materials. Interviews 
through key informants are not only common and relevant in qualitative research (Gray 2009), 
but they are also regularly used in organizational analyses. Interviews help to shed light on 
organizational dynamics in addition to motives, assumptions, and justifications behind actions 
that members take in organizations (Strati 2000). Secondary source documents included annual 
reports, mission statements, consultant reports, employee surveys, and newspaper and press 
accounts. Finally, I used data triangulation (Hartley 2004) to cross-check data across multiple 
sources where possible. This was critical to validate the data. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
The methodological approach of the study centered on a comparative cases study approach that 
supports historical explanatory analysis. Process-tracing, a methodologically rigorous way to 
analyze historical occurrences, was the key tool of analysis. The sample and population consisted 
of informants with deep and intimate knowledge of the organization such as those who have 
worked in upper-level or senior management roles. A semi-structured interview format allowed 
for appropriate standardization in the data collection, but it also permitted limited customization 
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in the interviews in order to uncover relevant data. I also employed primary and secondary 
source documentation that permitted data triangulation and validation. 
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4.0  EARLY REFORMS OF THE FRENCH POST OFFICE 
Modern reform at the French post office dates back nearly nine decades to the creation of a 
dedicated annex to the state budget in 1923. Since then, the post office has seen many attempts at 
reform, some more significant than others. Clear from these multiple reform attempts, however, 
is the difficulty in changing an organization with deep historical and cultural roots. Indeed, its 
origins are believed to date back to the 15th century regime of Louis XI and its horse-drawn 
royal postal system; the contemporary post office dates to 1878 when it became part of a 
ministry structure after the merger of postal and telegraphic services under one roof (1949). The 
profound grounding of the post office, then, has only served to confuse, confound, or stymie the 
myriad administrators, politicians, ministers, and other public officials who have sought to 
reform the organization during the modern era. This chapter focuses on early reforms and reform 
attempts, beginning with the introduction of the state budget annex. 
4.1 GENESIS OF MODERN REFORM: CREATION OF THE BUDGET ANNEX 
By the end of the First World War, administrators at the Administration des postes, des 
télégraphes et des téléphones (Post Office, Telegraph, and Telephone Administration; 
henceforth, the post office or PTT) were chaffing under an unclear budget situation. Although 
the post office provided important (and growing) services to the public, it lacked the necessary 
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budgetary means and independence to effectively carry out its burgeoning obligations since it did 
not have its own dedicated budget. Instead, its expenses and profits were confounded with the 
main state budget. In a 1917 report to a postal reform commission, the postal minister Etienne 
Clémentel (1917, 486) lamented: “The Treasury pays for the operations, but it keeps all the 
profits. Moreover, the post office cannot plan into the future as it does not have its own 
property.” The author of a Commission of Postal and Telegraphic Services report agreed with the 
minister, noting that the post office’s constraints prevented the post office from becoming “a 
modern service” in support of the industrial economy (Deshayes 1918, 411). A few years later, 
prominent management theorist Henri Fayol (1921) released his work about the post office 
entitled The Industrial Incapacity of the State: The PTT, helping to fuel the debate about its 
status. 
A greater degree of operational clarity for the post office arrived in 1923 when a proposal 
to create a budget annex for the post office came into force (Le Roux 2002). The annex was seen 
as a way to better support the growth of the post office and its industrial functions in support of 
the French economy. The budget annex responded to some of the concerns Minister Clémentel 
aired for more budgetary clarity and flexibility in responding to operational needs. A break-down 
of expenses and revenues was included in the new annex, as well as was the possibility to borrow 
and to amortize capital improvements over the long-term to help finance strategic investments 
(Le Trocquer and François-Marsal 1920). 
The creation of the budget annex resulted in greater financial transparency for the benefit 
of postal administrators, as well as additional tools for the post office to carry out and develop its 
services. In this way, it moved the post office a step further towards resembling a traditional state 
enterprise. Nevertheless, the annex fell short of a having a fully-separate budget as might a 
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traditional state enterprise. In other words, the post office’s finances would still not be fully 
walled-off from the general state budget; thus, it would not have a full margin of maneuver nor 
be fully independent. The annex, as Le Roux and Oger (2001) note, is thus best seen as a middle 
ground between the wishes of postal administrators who wanted more autonomy and the 
government that wanted to maintain control over it. 
Although the budget annex may have seemed appropriate at the time of its creation, it 
would not be long until postal administrators would come to resent its constraints. The annex 
arrangement did not permit full operational and financial independence for the post office since 
state budget administrators could continue to dip into the post office’s profits. Over the years, 
administrators would push for further autonomy for the organization (La Poste manager 2011b). 
Yet postal administrators’ frustrations with their diminishing autonomy in administration and 
planning would not be ultimately addressed until more than seven decades later. The annex 
would remain in place until 1990. 
4.2 GROWTH IN POSTAL SERVICES 
After the Second World War, the reconstruction, rebuilding, and development of the economy 
moved to the fore of governmental priorities. In addition, the de Gaulle government embarked on 
an aggressive industrial policy, some of which centered on nationalizations of previously private 
firms (Schmidt 1996). During the economic (and baby) boom period (the so-called 30 glorious 
years following the war), the post office experienced tremendous growth in demand for its 
services, growing about 5-6 percent per year (1954). Mail delivery thus expanded along with the 
growing consumer economy and the postal services became increasingly integral to the 
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functioning of France. It would take longer, until the 1960s, for telecommunications to take on 
greater industrial importance (Thatcher 1999). 
With the rapid expansion in demand for its services, though, the post office struggled to 
keep pace with societal growth and change. As one newspaper reporter’s (Choffel 1949) headline 
quipped, the PTT was “Better, but expensive!” Investments in infrastructure like sorting 
machines, mail delivery equipment, and postal branches were increasingly hampered by the lack 
of sustained funding. Hiring to sort and deliver the mail was also not keeping up with demand. 
Indeed, by 1954, the minister of postal, telecommunications, and telegraphic services defended 
the PTT in the Le Monde newspaper while, at the same time, announcing additional investment 
into the services by the French government to improve operations and quality (1954). By the 
early 1960s, the post office was reported to have reached a “saturation” point in its services; the 
personnel shortage and lack of investment to expand infrastructure, particularly in 
telecommunications, were taking their toll. To make matters even more challenging for postal 
administrators, the unions launched a series of strikes to protest what they saw as low salaries 
and the lack of personnel at peak service hours (Simon 1962). Due in part to its constraints it 
imposed on the post office’s finances, the budget annex arrangement was, according to 
observers, impeding modernization (1963). 
4.3 THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOOM AND THE ‘CRISIS OF THE PHONE’ 
Growth in telecommunications technology required greater levels of sustained national 
investment and innovation to keep pace with demand and not fall further behind other countries 
in the industrialized world. Indeed, the situation was a difficult one for France: The country 
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ranked dead last in the European Union and 17th in the world in terms of phone density (1963). 
Phone service was also criticized as too expensive in relation to other countries such as Sweden 
(Lafay 1962). One account from 1969 noted that the official waiting list to have a phone installed 
had 430,000 people on it. The average wait time for a phone was half a year, but some would 
have to wait 10 years for service (Blume 1969). 
The press was punctuated with articles about the “crisis of the telephone” (Bonnemain 
1968). Despite this, telecommunications was at the time not an important priority for the 
government; President Charles de Gaulle, for his part, was reported to have disliked the phone 
(Thatcher 1999). Telecommunications suffered from insufficient research and development 
funds in the emerging technology, as well as from a lack of investment in national switching 
centers and phone lines. Even if there had not been this problem, however, the country was not 
manufacturing enough telephones for use in homes or in businesses. The majority of telephone 
service was concentrated in Paris, a phenomenon that angered many citizens outside of the 
capital (1954). 
The serious shortfalls in telephone service eventually became a hot political issue 
following Charles de Gaulle’s resignation in the 1969 presidential elections. After Georges 
Pompidou was elected, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing became finance minister. At Pompidou’s 
behest, Giscard d’Estaing made it a key governmental priority to bring French 
telecommunications up to international standards; he secured significant state funding in order to 
accomplish this aim. The new PTT minister Robert Galley announced major investments in the 
technology and improvements, promising to bring France up to par with its Western 
counterparts. Under the country’s Sixth Plan, six billion francs would be invested in each of the 
next five years (Bonnemain 1969). A rapid expansion in the coverage, quality, and development 
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of telecommunications in France followed and the measure is widely considered a successful 
initiative to this day (Retired government official 2011). 
4.4 DIVERGING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURES 
An important facet of the personnel administration was the relative flexibility of workers to 
move between postal and telecommunications services. It was not abnormal for 
telecommunications workers to move to postal services mid-career, for example, and vice versa. 
This flexibility would be defended by union leaders in future reform proposals. Yet although in 
the early years of telecommunications’ development this feature might have fostered a sense of 
unity, the organizational divisions between the two services would come to be strained. 
The postal service was traditional and largely administrative in its approach and 
organizational culture while the telecommunications service was more technologically- and 
project- oriented (Retired senior executive 2011a). This was due, in part, to the differing 
educational backgrounds of the managers. In the telecommunications services, engineers came 
from a more technical educational background; in postal services administrators were trained in 
administration or law. On the other hand, it was due to the nature of the jobs: The core function 
of postal operations had been unchanged for hundreds of years while telecommunications 
engineers developed the service from what was once a relatively new field. Therefore, with each 
new phone engineer hired, futuristic research project launched, or new telephone line buried, 
telecommunications managers became further and further estranged from their postal 
counterparts. 
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An engineer in telecommunications thus found it thus increasingly difficult to relate to 
manager postal services; conversely, a postal worker found it difficult to understand the highly 
technical nature of telecommunications. For the organization, the difference gradually 
undermined the esprit de corps within the organization, despite the fact that inter-service 
mobility was formally possible (Retired senior executive 2011a). Finally, telecommunications 
administrators increasingly resented that finances from their operations were controlled by postal 
service administrators. They wanted greater autonomy, as well as “their” funds to be dedicated to 
telecommunications. The national industry group (Fédération nationale des télécommunications) 
argued that finances from telecommunications should be directed to the service’s growth and 
into improved services, not to funding deficits in the postal operations (1969). 
4.5 STATE MODERNIZATION AND FUTURE SERVICE NEEDS   
In the 1960s, state modernization moved onto the government’s agenda. A Ministry for 
Administrative Reforms was established in 1962 and Prime Minister Michel Debré (who 
founded the École nationale d’administration in 1945) was determined to modernize the public 
services (Knapp and Wright 2006). The government would commission studies such as the Nora 
report of 1967, which called for a new approach to public services (de Montricher 1996). The 
post office also figured into state modernization plans when the Future of the Post Office Study 
Group (Groupe de réflexions sur l’avenir des postes or GRAP) was convened to reimagine and 
plan the post office’s future. As Morgana (2008) explains, administrators believed reflection and 
long-term planning could improve the service’s functioning; GRAP would serve this purpose. 
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GRAP’s work was, in many ways, of a technocratic nature. It included sophisticated and 
technical econometric analyses about future mail and package volumes, as well as future needs 
in the various industrial sectors. For instance, the report’s authors projected that all sectors would 
see growth in postal volume; moreover, the profits from these gains would be reflected in the 
post office’s bottom line. In the paid mail category, the volume of all segments (letters, 
packages, and periodicals, for example) was projected through 1985 to rise with the exception of 
periodicals and the projection of registered packages. In fact, the total number of paid items sent 
through the postal service from 1950 to 1985 was predicted to more than triple from nearly 4.1 
million to just over 13 million items sent through the postal service. Finally, the GRAP authors 
benchmarked the French post office in relation to its international peers (Groupe de réflexion sur 
l’avenir de la Poste 1968). 
In terms of the post office’s clientele, GRAP identified single family households as 
comprising the largest share of letters weighing less than 20 grams with industry making up 
nearly half of package volume in 1966. Industry and agriculture,6 services, and the public sector 
captured roughly a third of the segment of letters weighing more than 20 grams; the rest was 
divided among households and various commercial entities. The authors also noted the changing 
societal demographics. Households would not only be sending more mail, but would become 
more urban-centered, professional, and less dependent on agriculture (Groupe de réflexion sur 
l’avenir de la Poste 1968). The GRAP’s observations, then, were reflective of the broader French 
planning tradition that sought to help coordinate economic and social development in the 
country, including in postal services (McArthur and Scott 1969). 
6 Agriculture represented less than one percent of the figure. 
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4.6 RESTRUCTURING AND RESISTING CHANGE 
The overall state modernization program, the Future of the Post Office Study Group, 
developments in telecommunications, and the growing divide between postal and 
telecommunications services all fed into the atmosphere for change at the post office. The post 
office, after all, had been slow to update its administration, introduce contemporary managerial 
procedures, take advantage of automation, and use technology to increase efficiency (Retired 
senior executive 2012b). During his presidential run, then-candidate Georges Pompidou even 
brought into his campaign Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s idea to create a national phone company 
as a way to improve the state of affairs (Bonnemain 1969). In 1971, PTT Minister Galley 
announced a major structural reorganization of the postal and telecommunications structures. 
Long having existed as one, the minister wanted to separate the postal and 
telecommunications services from each other and place them under the same PTT ministerial 
umbrella (financial services would be housed in the postal branch). Galley felt that the changing 
demands of the services made this change necessary. He thought that the financial services 
offered by the postal services would better fit in postal affairs as employees there could execute 
both functions. Conversely, telecommunications could be its own division (I. 1971, Isnard 1971). 
Galley argued that thanks to increasing automation, modernization, and technical 
changes, telecommunications were less and less complimentary to the offerings of the postal and 
financial services. A separation of the two services, Galley thought, would also allow 
telecommunications to better develop and manage its service offerings (1971). This, of course, 
lent credence to the notion, at the highest levels of the organization, of a cultural chasm between 
the postal and telecommunications services. 
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In 1971, Galley convened a technical committee to implement the structural changes, 
which centered on decentralizing responsibility and separating telecommunications from postal 
and financial services. Under the reform, telecommunications would fall under one management 
structure while postal and financial services would be grouped under a second one. These 
structural changes would be implemented down to the regional level with personnel 
management, social matters, budgeting, and accounting remaining at the PTT ministry. In 
addition, Galley worked to consolidate other management structures with the elimination of 
divisions for buildings and transportation, which were to be subsumed into the postal/financial 
and telecommunication management entities (Isnard 1971, Retired senior executive 2012b). 
Importantly, two of the main mail sorting centers (the Bordeaux and Marseille train 
stations) would cease to be managed by the roving (Paris-based) sorting center train (service de 
tri ambulant) and would be moved to the regional management structures. The administrators of 
the postal and telecommunications would be renamed chief executive officers (CEOs) and would 
be responsible for steering the organizations (1971). The CEOs would parallel commercial firms 
and would provide the organization with a “true commercial and industrial orientation,” Galley 
said (quoted in 1971, n.p.), reflecting an openness to the new ideas of management and to the 
market. Galley also wanted “management by objectives” and stronger administrative controls 
(quoted in Isnard 1971, 17). 
Galley’s proposed reform, however, struck at the heart of the PTT unions’ core fears. 
First, they were unsettled by the ministry’s growing use of the private sector in 
telecommunications and feared the eventual privatization of the service.7 Second, the union 
leaders saw the potential split of telecommunications from postal and financial services as an 
7 By early 1971, for instance, a second private firm had already been approved to provide capital to 
telecommunications (1971f). 
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existential threat, especially with regards to the mobility of personnel horizontally across the 
services (1971e). After all, the unions identified themselves in terms of a unified postal and 
telecommunications services (P and T). A split of the two services would call postal-
telecommunications solidarity into question even if cultural and other differences had already 
been growing between the two services for many years. One of the biggest unions, the 
Confédération générale du travail (CGT) lamented a potential loss to the services’ publicness and 
feared it could lead to privatization. It also argued that Galley’s proposed reform would permit 
the more profitable urban centers to be serviced by private operators while the (public) PTT 
would be left the less lucrative (primarily rural) service obligations (Cardoze 1971, 1971d). 
The tone of the public discourse between the minister and the unions surrounding the 
reform and change could thus be characterized at best as colorful and at worst as insulting. 
Galley was quoted in the (leftist) Humanité saying that “public service saboteurs” worked in the 
postal sorting centers, which he dubbed “sources of infection” for the ills of the PTT. This 
prompted the paper’s headline riposte, “The saboteur is Monsieur Galley” (1971c, n.p.). The 
Force ouvrière (FO) union was also critical of the minister’s proposal during a meeting of the 
ministry’s technical committee. FO worried about consolidation of power in the minister, leaving 
each of the overarching management structures only nominal control. This was because overall 
personnel and financial authority would be centralized at the ministerial level. The FO could, 
however, foresee the split into two management structures (as Galley proposed) so long as 
horizontal movement between them would be preserved and that they could exercise meaningful 
control over personnel and finances (1971a). 
The malaise among workers and the unions fermented over the following years, however, 
as they became increasingly upset by the degradation of working conditions, as well as of the 
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future direction of the PTT. They wanted to preserve PTT unity and prevent potential 
privatization of the services (Retired CGT leader 2011). The disagreement between workers and 
a manager in a sorting center that escalated into a nearly two month-long strike in 1974 typified 
the period’s social tensions, besides wreaking havoc on mail delivery (Bouget 2003). 
A parliamentary commission rendered a report on the necessity for change at the PTT. 
This concerned, in particular, the post office’s deteriorating financial situation, its needed 
modernization (automation, new postal codes, and problems in mail delivery), and solving 
problems with the telephone (Wagner 1972). The strike and political backlash from the unions, 
however, would have the effect of allowing only small and incremental changes to take place for 
the next decade and a half. Although the government had succeeded in separating postal from 
telecommunications services, there would be no national telecommunications (or postal) 
company with chief executive officers. Nonetheless, the government continued to engender an 
atmosphere of eventual change with, for example, its 1978 Nora report on the role that new 
information, computing, and communications technologies would play in the future (Walliser 
1989). Major reform at the post office, however, would have to wait until the end of the 
following decade. 
4.7 CHANGE IN REFORM’S TONE: SOCIALISTS TAKE POWER 
The new Socialist Party president François Mitterrand and a Socialist parliamentary majority 
were in place by late spring 1981. Under the new political constellation, the unions would now 
receive a more sympathetic audience at the Elysée Palace and Hôtel Matignon, the respective 
homes of the two institutions. This would also be the case at Ségur Avenue, site of the postal 
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ministry. The government appointed the well-known Socialist Louis Mexandeau to take the 
postal ministry reins. Upon his appointment, Mexandeau declared that “the long deterioration of 
the public services ended on May 10” (the day of Mitterrand’s election) and he promised 
improvements at the PTT (quoted in 1981b, n.p.). 
Mexandeau’s initial initiatives were both symbolic and substantive. They were symbolic 
because he sought to elevate the PTT from a state secretary to a full-fledged ministerial position 
while also promising to maintain postal and telecommunications solidarity. He also promised 
that the ministry would take steps to be more consultative and “democratic.” Mexandeau’s 
initiatives were substantive as he hired 8000 new employees to improve postal service quality at 
post offices, in delivery, and in telephone centers (1981b). Indeed, the specter of a definitive 
postal-telecom split had engendered much angst among unions; Galley’s experience likely led to 
Mexandeau gingerly approaching any changes. 
An important change in employment law covering the public sector (including the post 
office’s civil servants) would be put into place in 1982. Before the change, civil servants who 
went on strike for a short period of time (even for just a few minutes, for example) would see an 
entire day’s pay withheld. This, as a CGT union representative (2013) put it, forced civil servants 
to go on strike for the entire day. With the modification to the law, however, civil servants would 
see a better match-up of pay to the amount of time they went on strike. In other words, an hour’s 
worth of striking resulted in the loss of an hour’s pay (not of an entire day’s). It was frequently 
used in the sorting centers. The law was thus double-sided. On the one hand, it created fairer 
conditions for striking workers by making it less financially painful to strike. On the other hand, 
it inserted greater uncertainty and potential instability as workers could strike at peak times and 
then (for example) return for the rest of the day. 
 42 
Mexandeau’s pledge not to undermine postal and telecommunications solidarity, 
however, did not mean a lack of reform. Indeed, he emphasized the continued need to adapt each 
of the service’s management structures to better carry out its specialized functions, including in 
the decentralization of services and especially in telecommunications (1981b). The minister 
would thus seek incremental change at the PTT in the coming years. In 1982, for instance, he 
created five new management structures under the head of postal services in the areas of 
manufacturing (comprising the postal and financial services networks), communications, 
finances, logistics, and future outlooks, and international affairs (1982). 
Various other reform efforts were also undertaken to introduce more women into the 
services, including into the overwhelmingly male managerial ranks. Still other initiatives 
involved the introduction of new technology or new offerings. This included a new credit card 
for financial services clients, which was challenging to implement. One of the minister’s 
confidants (Retired government official 2011) recalled the problems in the credit card’s 
implementation that for him underlined his broader contention that the organization had a 
sometimes “medieval” mentality, especially with regards to the postal service. In his view, 
members of the postal services were often closed-minded and increasingly out of step with the 
more open telecommunications managers and workers. Postal workers were, he thought, still 
essentially shuttling “pieces of paper” from one point to another. Finally, the internationalization 
and Europeanization of telecommunications, along with its new technologies (Thatcher 1999), 
also had the effect of underlining cultural differences between the two services. 
Mexandeau commissioned a report on the PTT, which would help elucidate the options 
for further reform. He commissioned the dean of the University of Amiens’ law school, Jacques 
Chevallier, to lead a study group that would comprehensively examine the state of affairs at the 
 43 
postal and telecommunications services, look comparatively at other postal organizations, and 
recommend changes. In their work, Chevallier and his co-authors (1984) comprehensively 
examined the state of postal affairs in France, in addition to undertaking comparisons of sister 
postal services in the United States and in Sweden. 
For the French post office, the Chevallier report underscored the classical character of the 
post office: a “traditional administration” that was “rigid,” “highly centralized,” and almost 
“military-like” vis-à-vis its rank-and-file employees (Chevallier et al. 1984, 3). As the post office 
was guaranteed a monopoly in many areas, it was protected from competition. There were also 
considerable operational deficits with revenues not covering costs for the service, noted the 
report’s authors. The budget annex of 1923, while providing the post office in theory with 
greater autonomy to resemble more of a state enterprise, was constraining for the organization’s 
development. This arrangement, the authors said, was not conducive to a modern organization. 
Also troubling was the absence of a personnel management strategy and a dismal labor-
management climate, which contributed to strikes and a decline in the post office’s prestige 
among workers (present and future). Chevallier and his co-authors thus recommended changes to 
all of these areas in order to address the post office’s weaknesses while building on its still-
considerable strengths. 
The Chevallier report had thus nicely summarized the state of affairs for the post office, 
including its problems such as with the now-antiquated budget annex arrangement. Moreover, 
telecommunications was experiencing growth, feeling new European and international 
competition, and was undergoing technological change (Thatcher 1999). Despite this, 
Mexandeau was unable to pull off more dramatic change than the incremental modifications 
described previously. Indeed, he was frequently constrained by union leaders, especially by the 
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large CGT union. The CGT, for instance, rejected the minister’s proposal to create an office 
focused on strategy. More significantly, it sought to maintain postal-telecommunications unity at 
all cost and hold onto the existing structure (Retired government official 2011). 
4.8 MINISTER LONGUET’S PRIVATIZATION PUSH 
After the Center-Right swept into power in 1986, Gérard Longuet replaced Louis Mexandeau as 
postal and telecommunications minister (Walther 1986). Longuet came to the ministry with 
strong ideological leanings and with strong views about the state’s role. Indeed, he arrived as 
part of elections that had the campaign of “rolling back the state”; earlier, he was the architect of 
a 1979 report that called for deregulation and cutting the number of civil servants (de Montricher 
1996, 246). Longuet then was viewed with intense suspicion by trade union leaders. He was 
considered (in a disparaging way) an “ultra” neo-liberal (Alesandrini 1986). 
Evoking the specter of fierce competition in the market, Longuet built on former postal 
minister Galley’s efforts to make the organizations more commercial in orientation. Longuet 
proposed to turn the post office into an établissement public à caractère industriel et commercial 
(EPIC). As an EPIC, the postal service would become a full-fledged state enterprise. 
Telecommunications, for its part, would be transformed into a private corporation, a societé 
nationale (SA). The minister, it should be noted, was also open to turning both the postal and 
telecommunications services into separate EPICs. Nonetheless, Longuet believed that a SA 
arrangement for telecommunications would better permit the organization to raise needed private 
capital for investment and expansion (Labesse 1986). 
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Putting aside the minister’s ideology, the minister was correct to raise the issue of an 
increasingly competitive telecommunications environment. As Thatcher (1999) notes, the 
industry from the 1960s to 1980s morphed from national to transnational in character and rapid 
technological advancements, deregulation, and internationalization all marked the period. 
Telecommunications would also eventually figure into European Communities (EC) services 
liberalization plans by the end of the decade. The experience of the American 
telecommunications firms, particularly the break-up of American Telephone and Telegraph’s 
(AT&T) monopoly, as well as with the growth of new foreign competitors, were developments 
of which French telecommunications administers were keenly aware (Retired senior executive 
2011a). They worried that their own structure would leave them in danger of falling behind 
(Betts 1986).  
The initial reaction from the union’s to Longuet’s proposal was far from positive; the two 
largest unions (CGT and FO) were opposed with the smaller Confédération française 
démocratique du travail (CFDT) union open to some changes (Labesse 1986). The unions were 
most particularly concerned about their members losing their civil servant status, an issue that 
could be at stake in a privatized post office (Alesandrini 1986, L. 1986). This would mean that 
civil service privileges such as job security and pay could potentially be at risk, in addition to the 
publicness of either or both of the services. 
Longuet succeeded in introducing greater structural separation between postal services 
and financial services under the postal services management structure. Nevertheless, he failed in 
his more ambitious proposal to create from the post office either two EPICs out of postal and 
telecommunications services or one EPIC and one SA (out of postal services and 
telecommunications services, respectively). He had to eventually thus content himself with a 
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lighter approach to the problems of the PTT (Peytavin 1988). Moreover, social tensions and 
strikes marked part of tenure (Groussard 1989b). Longuet’s “neo-liberal” plans for EPICs (or an 
EPIC and a SA) were, in the end, too bold in their style; moreover, the large unions felt the 
minister was divorced from the wishes of postal personnel (Retired CGT leader 2011). By 1988, 
a new Socialist Party majority government would be back in place. This ended the cohabitation 
between the Socialist president Mitterrand and the conservative parliamentary majority. 
4.9 CONCLUSION 
Early reform at the French post office centered on providing the post office with additional 
budgetary clarity and autonomy with the 1923 budget annex. Nonetheless, the annex would 
prove over the following decades to be an inapt solution to the organization’s development. With 
state modernization having moved onto the government’s agenda in the 1960s, the post office 
launched its own planning process under the Future of the Post Office Study Group. The group’s 
work, in keeping with French planning tradition of the period, projected future changing societal 
demographics and growth in postal services. Later in the 1970s Minister Galley implemented 
important structural changes that split the postal and telecommunications services into two 
separate managerial structures. A further push by the minister to orient the services in a more 
commercial direction failed, however. Moreover, strong social tensions marked the era. 
Successive ministers pursued incremental reforms while a push to privatize telecommunications 
also failed. Finally, a cultural cleavage between postal and telecommunications managers that 
had its roots in the 1960s but was fully apparent by the end of the 1980s weighed heavily on the 
organization. Technological change, growing competition, and the Europeanization and 
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internationalization of telecommunications would further exacerbate the now-tenuous postal-
telecom relationship. These considerations, plus a new government and eager minister, would set 
the stage for the post office’s next reform. 
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5.0  CONTEMPORARY REFORM OF THE FRENCH POST OFFICE 
Arguably the most significant recent reform of the French post office in 1989 led to the 
separation of telecommunications from postal services, which turned them into separate 
commercial entities with far greater autonomy than before. This split in many ways reflects the 
fruits of a long struggle for more profound organizational change since the introduction of the 
budget annex in the 1920s. This was, as noted in the previous chapter, exacerbated by a growing 
divide between postal and telecommunications personnel. This was also a product of the 
changing nature of telecommunications: namely, from its internationalization, competitive 
forces, and technological change. Postal Minister Gérard Longuet tried and failed to create a 
private corporation out of the telecommunications services. Following an extensive airing of the 
issue, a reform would be passed in 1989 under a new minister that would turn the postal and 
telecommunications services into separate state enterprises. The move redefines the post office 
and its place in the French economy and society, marking the beginning of a series of deep 
internal organizational changes that continue to the present day. 
5.1 TOWARDS A MAJOR REFORM 
Winning a majority in the National Assembly reversed the Socialist Party’s political fortunes in 
1988 and gave the Socialist president François Mitterrand the opportunity to appoint one of his 
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confidants as minister of post and telecommunications. Mitterrand selected for the post of prime 
minister Michel Rocard, a committed reformer (Rouban 1996). In addition to the change in the 
political constellation, several other important developments were coming together to create an 
environment conducive to reform: the extant telecom-postal cultural divide, technological 
change and deregulation in the telecommunications industry, disruptive industrial action by the 
unions, a new push by the government for state modernization, and emerging services 
liberalization of the European Communities (EC) including in the telecommunications and postal 
sectors. In the new postal minister Paul Quilès, Mitterrand had a skilled political operator who 
had served as one of his presidential campaign managers in the 1981 election. Quilès had also 
been minister of defense and minister of transportation. (Quilès likely honed some of his 
negotiation skills while helping oversee the national railway company, which has a reputation for 
its strikes.) Michel Rocard, for his part, was set on modernizing the bureaucracy and made it an 
important part of his agenda (Rouban 1997). 
As described in Chapter 4, a cultural division between postal and telecommunications 
managers had been growing since the 1960s; by the 1980s with even more rapid technological 
change in telecommunications, administrators and managers pushed for structural change (V. 
1988a, Retired senior executive 2011a).8 New technological developments in 
telecommunications were rapidly altering the ways of the industry. The introduction of fiber 
optic lines, satellite technology, and falling telephony prices were forcing telecom administrators 
and managers to rethink their business model and strategy to compete on a global scale. 
Deregulation in several countries was on the agenda and the break-up of American Telephone 
and Telegraph’s monopoly left a new group of regional “Baby Bell” telecom players in the 
8 Top telecommunications managers even wrote a letter to the 1988 presidential candidates effectively endorsing 
Longuet’s proposed split (V. 1988a). 
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United States. In the United Kingdom, British telecommunications were being privatized; the EC 
began a drive to play a far greater role in the field, setting the stage for the sector’s liberalization 
(Thatcher 1999). French telecom administrators were highly conscious of these developments 
(Retired senior executive 2011a). 
The effects of new technological developments, industry change, deregulation, and 
globalization meant that France’s telecommunications would find it difficult to maintain the 
status quo. Although the country had invested heavily in previous decades under President 
Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s modernization initiative, massive new investments in infrastructure 
would be required in France to keep up. Europe was also at the early phases of a push to 
liberalize Europe’s telecommunications market. Although administrators had a separate 
management structure within the ministry, they felt constrained by the PTT’s structure (Retired 
senior executive 2011a). Moreover, telecommunications services were also losing key human 
capital to the private sector. It was increasingly unable to compete for top managerial talent due 
to its antiquated personnel system (Groussard 1989a). 
The post office already operated in certain competitive markets (such as express package 
delivery or direct marketing) and had formed new holding companies and subsidiaries in order to 
do so. One of the most important subsidiaries was Chronopost, an up-start express delivery 
service. It was created in the mid-1980s to provide faster shipping times for commercial 
customers and compete with private firms such as DHL and United Parcel Service (Le Galès 
1988a, Seroussi 1989, Darrigrand and Pelissier 1997).  
Telecommunications administrators also thought that they could push further in this 
direction and they observed the beginnings of a nascent mobile telephone industry. 
Telecommunications also had its subsidiaries such as France Telecom for its international 
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division; it later re-branded telecommunications as France Télécom to provided it with a stronger 
identity (Retired senior executive 2011a). Subsidiaries would often bring in top managers from 
the main post office or telecommunications services to manage them, thus building an important 
organizational bridge to the larger organization. The subsidiaries allowed administrators to raise 
capital from outside and overcome the limited capital funds from the state. Also important was 
the ability to staff the subsidiaries with contractual employees. These employees were usually 
paid less and did not fall under civil service rules since they were detached from the main 
organizations through the holding companies (La Poste manager 2011f).  
Unlike administrators who took advantage of subsidiaries as a way to develop beyond the 
ministerial structure’s confines and meet new strategic commercial pressures, the trade unions 
became increasingly suspicious of their growth. They saw subsidiaries as stealth attempts at 
privatization and protested them (La Poste manager 2011f). Yet this was an area in which the 
minister was unlikely to back-track on, perhaps especially given his views to create an 
“entrepreneurial public service” at the post office (Le Galès 1988b, n.p., Quilès 1988). Quilès 
wanted to adapt the organizations so they could be more effective in serving clients. Yet in his 
negotiations for reform of the organizations, Quilès’ proposals for change came up against 
resistance as they did for previous ministers. This was especially from the Confédération 
générale du travail (CGT) and Force ouvrière (FO) unions, although the FO was less strident in 
its opposition) (Retired government official 2012c). This was true even though upon arrival at 
the ministry Quilès pledged to preserve civil servant status for the current workforce in the name 
of restoring the public service’s prestige. To mark a contrast with the previous government and 
its postal minister Longuet, Quilès decried the “brutal” deregulatory politics of period (Le Galès 
1988b). 
 52 
Despite this, unions staged dramatic industrial action in 1988. Called the yellow truck 
strike for the color of the post office’s delivery trucks, the strike was especially hard on small- 
and medium-sized businesses as mail and package deliveries were impeded over several days. As 
one business owner put it, “It’s a catastrophe. A few hundred truck drivers have brought a city 
like Paris to its knees” (Vaysse 1988, n.p.). Unions such as the CGT feared not only a postal and 
telecommunications split, but also that reform would affect their civil servant privileges and that 
services would be completely deregulated (Retired CGT leader 2011). Behind the scenes, 
though, Quilès was negotiating with the unions on changes to the post office to allow it to evolve 
and adapt to its changing commercial demands and an altered economic picture, notably in 
telecommunications. Tensions were thus present, but Quilès insisted on pursuing change at the 
post office. Although he was ideologically closer to the unions as a Socialist politician, he was 
also a reformer. 
Quilès therefore convened marathon meetings at the ministry, one of which lasted 13 
hours, according to a recollection. The minister wanted restructuring of the post office to make it 
less bureaucratic, more dependable, and more efficient. With the minister’s effort to be more 
conciliatory towards the unions, the massive yellow truck strike made little sense to him. Yet 
contentious meetings (and what seemed like endless back-and-forth exchanges) yielded little 
agreement: The minister could not overcome the resistance to change from the largest union, the 
CGT. The FO union for the most part sympathized with the CGT, but its position was less clear. 
The Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) union was reformist. Ultimately, 
the minister became deeply frustrated by the unions’ intransigence (Retired government official 
2012c, Retired senior executive 2012b). 
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The CGT’s leaders wanted one of two options: (1) adapt the 1929 budget annex and 
modernize the services or (2) separate postal and telecommunications into legally separate 
entities under the control of a ministry (Dumas 1989). The CGT also wanted to retain civil 
service status for postal and telecommunications employees, as well as create a separate category 
of civil servants for the post office (Retired CGT leader 2011). It is thus possible to see how the 
importance of postal and telecommunications unity between the services proved important at the 
time of negotiation, even if the unity between the two services was tenuous in practice. On the 
other hand, the reformist CFDT and its smaller sister Confédération française des travailleurs 
chrétiens (CFTC) union were more open to change (La Poste manager 2012b). The union 
advertised in the Le Monde newspaper in support of more budgetary autonomy for the post office 
(Fédération Unifiée des PTT CFDT 1988). 
In the end, however, negotiations between the minister and the unions deadlocked. In the 
minister’s view, the CGT’s position effectively translated into non-reform of the post office. 
Quilès thus decided to launch a high-profile “public debate” on the future of the postal and 
telecommunications services in France (V. 1988b). It the minister could not win his case for 
reform behind closed doors with the unions, he would take it out in the open, directly before the 
public. 
5.2 PRÉVOT REFORM COMMISSION 
Paul Quilès appointed Hubert Prévot, then-president of the Cours des comptes (state auditor) and 
a close friend of Prime Minister Michel Rocard, to lead an extended consultative review on the 
future of the postal and telecommunications services (Féligonde 1988). Quilès became convinced 
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of the wisdom of advancing the reform in the public sphere in order to create an “entrepreneurial 
public service” (Retired government official 2012c, Quilès 1988). Prévot’s selection was 
strategic: Prévot served previously in the Rocard government as a head planning commissioner 
and had been in the CFDT’s leadership ranks (Féligonde 1988). On its face, the union affiliation 
would make him less threatening to the left. As head of the prestigious state auditor, Prévot’s 
recommendations would carry considerable weight among policy makers and the public, lending 
them an aura of neutrality. 
Although he excluded privatization as an option, Rocard announced that the debate over 
the post office’s future would take place under his full support and “without taboos.” For Rocard, 
neither the status quo nor opposition to dialogue would be tolerated (Vaysse 1989c). More 
cynically, however, the public debate could be seen as a way to circumvent the unions. The 
secretary general of the CGT postal section, for example, derided the Prévot exercise as a 
“cliché” with the goal of gaining public acceptance of a pre-determined outcome (Dumas 1989). 
Indeed, such “independent” commissions often provide policy-makers political cover to propose 
and implement controversial change. 
Prévot led an extended consultative process that took his commission not only to 
France’s largest cities, but also to small towns and villages (Vaysse 1989c). Such an approach 
underlined the institutional and cultural importance of the post office to French society. Indeed, 
the post office is often an integral part of life in small towns (and even in larger cities). Changes 
of a letter carrier can thus provoke consternation among citizens (Koxar 2007), to say nothing 
about when specific post offices that could be proposed for closure, consolidation, or relocation 
(Retired senior executive 2012b). Anecdotes abound of letter carriers bringing a baguette to the 
isolated elderly woman in the countryside or a man receiving his life-sustaining medication by 
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way of the mail (La Poste manager 2011c). Moreover, the post office is also responsible for 
delivering most national and regional newspapers. It has also offered the Livret A passbook 
savings account, permitting citizens from varying economic backgrounds to accumulate savings 
(Government official 2012a). 
These aspects of the post office thus serve to reinforce social cohesion in France while 
also lending the post office an almost mythical status among the French. Indeed, the post office’s 
standing among the population finds few parallels elsewhere (Government official 2012a). In 
addition to the organizational, political, logistical, and business aspects of postal reform, Quilès 
and his reform team would therefore have to contend with this social side of the post office. 
The Prévot-led consultation over the future of the postal and telecommunications services 
was participative and innovative for its time. It solicited participation from all of the postal-
telecom employees, the unions, and the public. Internally, employees could provide feedback 
through traditional mail, the electronic Minitel information system, 8000 meetings, or video 
conferences. Externally, the public was invited to participate in numerous public hearings around 
the country, at seven large national meetings, and through written questionnaires. Prévot’s 
commission also consulted industry experts, academics, high civil servants, and members of 
industry to round out survey collection (Prévot 1989, Vaysse 1989c). 
When Prévot presented the final report to the minister at the end of July 1989, he made 
four main observations and recommendations for future reform: 
• Have the state guarantee these important public services in a supervisory and regulatory 
capacity while dispensing with the cumbersome and erratic budget annex in favor of a 
normal state appropriation, common for other state enterprises that are industrial and 
commercial; 
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• Provide the post office and France Télécom with the autonomy and independence to 
carry out their missions, making them independent and separate legal entities with control 
over their budgets and operations, and keep the financial services within the post office; 
• Continue PTT (postal and telecommunications services) unity by maintaining the link 
between the organizations’ social, educational, and research activities by creating a “PTT 
National Council” to oversee such activities; and 
• Better incorporate the subsidiaries of the post office and telecommunications into the 
main organizations’ management, salaries, and working conditions (Prévot 1989). 
In certain respects, the recommendations were carefully formulated in an attempt to 
assuage union concerns. This included maintaining PTT solidarity in ancillary activities and 
harmonizing the subsidiaries with the larger organizations. In other respects, however, the 
recommendations were less subtle. Prévot called for a definitive postal-telecom split that was 
largely similar to the previous government’s unsuccessful reform proposal to create two separate 
enterprises. In even bolder terms, Prévot suggested minor modification to the civil service. The 
change was immediately reported in the left-wing press as an “abandonment” of civil service 
status for the post office’s employees (Laurent 1989). In reality, Prévot proposed a relatively 
minor change that would likely affect civil servants only on the margins; his suggestion was that 
employees be given a choice between maintaining their present civil servant status or moving to 
a new employment regime (Vaysse 1989a, b).  
Prévot’s suggestions, if implemented, would then take the post office beyond the 
previous incremental reforms of the past. The creation of two state enterprises would, in effect, 
redefine the post office and its place in the French economy and society. The postal and 
telecommunications services would, in other words, become state enterprises like other 
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publically-owned companies. It would also mean that the two services would be free to take their 
own independent paths, untethered from the constraints of each other’s presence. This, of course, 
was of particular importance to telecommunications administrators. Finally, the reform proposed 
keeping the financial services within a new postal entity rather than spinning it off and creating a 
postal bank as was the case in many other European countries (including Germany). 
5.3 OBSTACLES TO CHANGE 
The Prévot exercise, a reformist government, and a confluence of other factors had then opened a 
“window of opportunity” for policy change (Kingdon 1995). Nonetheless, careful resolution of 
several sticking points still needed to be worked out. This included maneuvering around the 
complicated arrangement surrounding the post office’s financial services section, as well as 
securing agreement from the finance ministry, the parliament, and the president. Finally, Quilès 
would have to deal with opposition from several unions hostile to the Prévot recommendations. 
For more than a century, the post office offered its savings products and postal checks in 
order to encourage the French to save more and to facilitate the adoption of banking services in 
the country. The arrangement was successful. Yet it was conducted under a highly complicated, 
inter-institutional arrangement that left the post office as a mere repository for funds. Once the 
post office received the funds through its financial services section, they were sent to the 
treasury. In turn, the treasury transferred the funds to the Caisse nationale d’epargne, a national 
savings institution. The funds were further parceled out to the Caisse des dépôts et consignations, 
another public financial institution (Oger 2006, Vezinat 2010). This all left the post office with 
nominal control over its financial product offerings since they were in practice administered by 
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the treasury, not by the post office. Quilès wanted the financial services to be able to offer a 
larger and more robust array of financial products including loans and insurance (Labrouillere 
1990). Such offerings would approach those supplied by banks. 
 As the report was being finalized, Quilès and his cabinet lobbied the finance minister on 
the case for change at the postal and telecommunications services since the ministry had a 
powerful say over any reform. In addition to the needed green light for the reform itself, the 
question remained as to how to handle the relationship of the post office’s financial services 
section and the products that could be offered there. Finally, there was the issue of the enormous 
retirement pension legacy obligations that would eventually cause considerable financial strain 
on the post office (La Banque Postale supervisory board member 2012, Retired senior executive 
2012b). 
Securing agreement for the overall postal and telecommunications reform was not the 
largest hurdle; Quilès was given the ministry’s accord. It helped that Finance Minister Pierre 
Bérégovoy had a good personal rapport with Quilès. Bérégovoy was largely supportive of the 
core of the reform and would not seek major concessions from the postal minister. Nonetheless, 
the tension concerning the arrangement between the funds deposited at the post office was left to 
linger. An expansion of the financial services would also not come to fruition as would not a 
resolution of the legacy pension liabilities (La Banque Postale supervisory board member 2012, 
Retired government official 2012c, Retired senior executive 2012b). 
The issue of the expansion of banking products was difficult for Quilès as he ultimately 
publically reversed his position and opposed the expansion of financial services at the post office 
that he had initially supported (P. and V. 1990). Indeed, a strong banking lobby made its 
presence felt during the parliamentary debate (Labrouillere 1990). For postal administrators, 
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however, it meant that they could not widely expand the post office’s financial offerings as they 
had hoped. Finally, Quilès secured the support of an initially reluctant President Mitterrand who 
ultimately had final say over the reform due to France’s hybrid presidential-parliamentary system 
(Retired senior executive 2012b). 
The reform that Quilès announced included the core of the Prévot recommendations 
(postal-telecommunications split and the creation of two state firms) with the exception of the 
change to the status of the civil servants. Prévot had recommended that employees be given the 
option to either stay in the current system or to move to a new personnel arrangement; Quilès 
rejected it. All civil servants would be grandfathered in the new entities’ civil services. 
Nonetheless, there would be changes to the civil service’s grade scheme, Quilès made clear 
(Vaysse 1989b). There was, however, significant union resistance to the proposed reform that 
Quilès would need to overcome. 
The CGT and FO unions lined up against the proposal while the CFDT and CFTC were 
more open to change (Apel-Muller 1990, C. 1990). The CGT wanted the post office to continue 
under direct state management: It could either modernize within the existing 1923 budget annex 
structure or postal and telecommunications services could be separated and housed in a state 
ministry. The CGT was also staunchly opposed to a reform that would modify (in any way) the 
law governing civil servants (Dumas 1989, Retired CGT leader 2011). Both the CGT and FO 
saw the Prévot proposal leading to privatization and the state abrogating its public service 
obligations (Apel-Muller 1990). This was even if the public services could be secured through 
regulation, as was implied by Prévot’s recommendations. 
The smaller CFDT and sister CFTC unions came to the debate from a different 
perspective. They sympathized with the minister’s reform plans for the post office and were open 
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to negotiations with him to ensure the post office’s viability (V. 1989, La Poste manager 2012b). 
In fact, they had paid for advertising in Le Monde a year earlier to air their view about the need 
for more operational control of the postal and telecommunications services (Fédération Unifiée 
des PTT CFDT 1988). The CFDT and CFTC union leaders believed that the state has less of a 
role to play in the day-to-day management of commercial businesses (La Poste manager 2012b). 
Yet it is also worth recalling that Prévot was himself a former leader of the CFDT; this could 
have also had an impact on their point of view. 
In the end, parliamentarians in the National Assembly overwhelmingly (285 votes in 
favor with 30 opposed) adopted Quilès proposed reform (S. 1990). This showed not only that 
there was relatively high consensus for change among the political class, but that the reform also 
struck the right balance in its approach and tone. In terms of the unions, the CGT was opposed 
until the final Assembly vote; the FO, CFDT, and the CFTC joined in support of the new law 
(Desportes 1990). Existing civil servants were guaranteed their civil service status and there 
would be a generous transition period. The civil service itself, however, would be greatly 
simplified and consolidated. The two organizations, in the end, would be turned into state 
enterprises (La Poste manager 2011b). The hard work of internal organizational change could 
now begin. 
5.4 INTERNAL REFORM BEGINS IN EARNEST 
On January 1, 1991, the post office that had been known as “la Poste” became “La Poste” with 
the capital letter “l” signifying its new enterprise status (Darrigrand and Pelissier 1997). 
Telecommunications also saw its “France Télécom” identity become official, reflecting a 
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rebranding effort that administrators introduced earlier (Retired senior executive 2011a). 
Although the Quilès-led reform effort had been long and complicated, significant internal 
organizational reform would now begin in earnest for the two enterprises. 
In anticipation of reform, Quilès appointed a new head of the post office, Yves Cousquer. 
Quilès knew Cousquer from their days in the same graduating class at the prestigious École 
polytechnique engineering school. When Quilès was transportation minister, he tapped Cousquer 
to serve as his director of economic and international affairs at the ministry in 1984. Cousquer 
had largely spent his career in the private sector, a then-novelty at the post office, and one that 
underlined the minister’s intension of breaking with the status quo (Groussard 1989b, Vey 1989). 
Cousquer prioritized modernization and sought to instill a more business-like culture at 
La Poste. He had been impressed by former postal minister Robert Galley’s introduction of 
modern managerial methods at the post office in the 1970s; he felt obliged to further update La 
Poste’s managerial practices. Cousquer had attended a management training workshop and 
seminar in the United States early in his career and honed managerial skills over the years; he 
could now implement at La Poste some of these management approaches, many of them rooted 
in corporate private sector practice (Retired senior executive 2012b, Groussard 1989b). 
Besides negotiating an extensive services contract with the state that explicitly detailed 
the obligations of La Poste in public service provision, state subsidies, and other requirements, 
Cousquer concentrated on three substantive reform areas: personnel, decentralization, and 
financial services (Retired senior executive 2012b). Implementing personnel reform was by far 
the greatest early challenge. Although the reform split the post office from telecommunications 
the organizations continued to jointly manage hiring and recruitment. These had to be separated 
in order that each organization could manage its personnel independently. The work to separate 
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was already in process during the run-up to the formal reform with the civil service corps, grades 
and ranks renegotiated. This would permit the creation of separate departments of personnel at 
both the new La Poste and France Télécom (Retired manager 2011, Retired senior executive 
2012b, Retired government official 2012c). 
Under the old civil service system, there was little coherence between rank and job 
responsibility. It was also highly complex. Reform thus centered on streamlining from 45 into six 
corps and 111 to 11 grades, as well as moving civil servants into one of four job functions 
(Retired manager 2011, La Poste manager 2012a). Under the new regime, job experience and the 
capability of the individual (rather than the academic degree) would be emphasized in hiring 
(Charpentier 1990). 
The new personnel management regime encountered resistance, however, from the CGT. 
This was true even though civil servants would not lose their civil servant status or benefits. 
Nonetheless, the CGT continued to oppose the reforms while the FO, CFDT, and CFTC unions 
supported the changes to the personnel system on the whole. Ultimately, around five billion 
francs would be paid out over several years to smooth the transition process. This would be in 
the form of bonuses or other incentives. Civil servants who migrated to the new scheme were 
usually placed at a higher rank and salary after the transition. Although the personnel reform 
greatly simplified the system, it also resulted in higher payroll costs for La Poste due to the 
relatively generous transition measures. Administrators nonetheless saw the reform as essential 
to the organization’s modernization and future (Leroy 1990, Charpentier 1990, C. 1990, Retired 
manager 2011). 
For Cousquer, the geographical organization of La Poste was convoluted and inefficient: 
There were too many regional offices, hierarchies were strict, and control was overly centralized 
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in Paris. He thus made decentralization and consolidation of regional management structures an 
important priority. He streamlined regional management divisions to eight. The move made 
sense to the La Poste president not only from his management philosophy, but also from a 
practical perspective. Why should Paris and its suburbs have two management structures, he 
thought? This was duplicative and superfluous, especially given his goals for the organization. 
He wanted to make management more effective and give them more autonomy. In his view, 
streamlined and reorganized divisions would help facilitate this and provide better service quality 
(Retired senior executive 2012b). 
La Poste’s structural reorganization complemented the personnel reform as employees 
could be reassigned to different areas (and to different managerial units) based on function. It 
also fit with the general managerial trends of the period. Yet the reforms at the same time 
indirectly advanced a previous governmental priority of decentralizing the French state and 
making it less administratively concentrated in Paris. 
Cousquer also placed a priority on modernization, breaking a taboo among branch 
employees when he experimented with dispensing of the protective glass walls separating postal 
workers from the public at service counters (Retired senior executive 2012b). When he ordered 
tropical palm trees for the lobby of La Poste’s headquarters, it was seen by some as extravagant 
(Government official 2012b). Cousquer, however, was trying to infuse a more business-like 
ethos into La Poste’s administrative culture. He improved La Poste’s delivery services by air, 
modernized its sorting centers, and instructed employees on the front lines to refer to postal 
clients as “customers.” He also bolstered the quality of financial services and pushed to make the 
division’s offerings more personalized as part of a wider improvement initiative there (Retired 
senior executive 2012b). 
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La Poste’s financial services had declined over the years since they were highly limited 
(La Banque Postale supervisory board member 2012, La Poste senior executive 2012). La Poste 
was best known for its passbook savings account (the Livret A) and its postal checks that 
functioned similar to money orders. Yet it was never a full-fledged bank and was losing market 
share by not being able to offer to customers an array of diverse financial products. At the time 
of reform in 1989, its savings deposits as a percentage of the market had shrunk from 30 to 12 
percent (more than half). The private banking industry was pushing to offer the Livret A, which 
La Poste provided with two other institutions under a legally-protected monopoly. Moreover, La 
Poste was prohibited from making personal loans with the exception of home improvement 
loans. This was at a time when demand for loan products was growing fast in France (Court and 
Le Galès 1989). 
La Poste was thus limited in its financial services offerings and constrained by their 
structure. Nevertheless, it also had an enormous advantage if it could expand its financial 
services and gain more flexibility from the state. For instance, the savings accounts and the 
processing of the postal checks provided a steady cash flow. The problem was that the finance 
ministry effectively controlled these funds and saw them as part of the state treasury (Vezinat 
2010). It was effectively co-administration with the administrative power falling far more on the 
finance ministry’s side (La Banque Postale supervisory board member 2012, Retired government 
official 2012c). 
Control of the funds and their future was thus of strategic importance to both the state and 
to the post office’s future. With the finance ministry effectively exercising control over La 
Poste’s financial services funds, La Poste was deprived of developing the area further in a 
meaningful manner. Administrators saw the arrangement as untenable and ripe for reform 
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(Vezinat 2010). In the interim, however, incremental changes would have to be put through such 
as Cousquer’s hiring of a banker from the private sector to introduce new products and services 
to modernize where possible (Retired senior executive 2012b). La Poste also succeeded in 
negotiating a change in 1995 so that the finance ministry would no longer arbitrarily dip into La 
Poste’s financial services coffers (La Banque Postale supervisory board member 2012). Financial 
services would have to wait for more profound reform until the mid-2000s. 
An importance consequence of the Quilès reform was how it redefined La Poste’s 
obligations in relation to the state. Once the post office became La Poste (a commercial state 
enterprise not managed on a day-to-day basis by the ministry), service delivery was redefined 
from state-supplied to contractual. The service obligations of La Poste would now be 
contractually agreed upon in a services agreement. The agreement detailed La Poste’s 
obligations to the state and the state’s compensation for certain public service tasks (such as the 
state subsidizing the delivery of newspapers by mail). Moreover, this redefinition of service 
delivery in France’s postal sector dovetailed with Brussels’ push for regulated liberalization of 
the postal market under the single market program. For the postal sector, this would begin 
officially in 1992 with the issuance of a European Commission (1992) green paper. The postal 
services would thus cease to fall under the imprecise notion of service public and would move 
into clear and contractually-enumerated obligations. 
5.5 REFORM MOMENTUM SLOWS, 1995-2002 
The end of Mitterrand’s nearly 14 year-long presidency in 1995 resulted in the more 
conservative president Jacques Chirac being elected president to govern alongside a conservative 
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majority in the National Assembly. The previous year, André Darrigrand replaced Cousquer as 
president of La Poste in a move that reflected the influence of politics on La Poste’s 
management. Cousquer was viewed as too close to the (departed) postal minister Paul Quilès 
(1993). Darrigrand turned out to be a weak president, however, and was generally seen as an 
ineffectual leader (Government official 2012b). Darrigrand was replaced in 1996 by Claude 
Bourmaud (E. 1996). 
In 1995, Prime Minister Alain Juppé proposed pension reforms that would have extended 
the working age of most public sector workers. The effort prompted a vigorous response from 
the unions, which opposed changes to the law. After a month of strikes around the country, 
including in postal sorting centers and at post offices, the government backed down. The strikes 
not only weakened the conservative government, but they also dealt a serious blow to the still 
vulnerable La Poste (La Poste manager 2011a). La Poste’s balance sheet would reflect a one 
billion franc loss due in part to the strikes (Le G. 1996a). Postal volume had fallen considerably 
during the strike and did not readily recover; several business clients, the bread and butter of La 
Poste’s revenues, had switched to other private operators. The strikes, even if they had not been 
directly related to anything La Poste had proposed, nonetheless weakened morale among postal 
managers and reformers at a time where the organization was trying to modernize and transform 
itself into an enterprise (La Poste manager 2011a). 
La Poste’s administrators, however, adapted from the 1995 experience. They were 
determined not to let strikes wreak as much havoc on the organization in the future. Going 
forward, they would deploy a secret plan to circumvent strikes so that mail sorting could 
continue. This would take place in shadow suburban sorting centers away from the downtown 
centers, the strongholds of the unions. The shadow centers could be run by managers and 
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contractual employees, thus permitting La Poste’s work to continue during strikes (albeit at 
reduced capacity) (La Poste manager 2011a). 
Administrators would also begin to confront the looming retirement issue. Indeed, a large 
number of civil servants would require pension payouts in the not-so-distant future that would 
quickly overwhelm La Poste’s finances. After negotiations between La Poste leaders and finance 
ministry officials, it was decided that La Poste would make a large, one-time payment to the 
retirement fund. At the same time, La Poste’s retirement system would be merged into the 
country’s primary retirement plan. In this scheme, used by the majority of French companies, the 
employer and employee share in funding pensions. The change would thus place La Poste under 
the standard retirement scheme. Had La Poste remained under its historical pension scheme, it 
would have been financially crippled as it alone was responsible for guaranteeing and funding 
pensions (La Banque Postale supervisory board member 2012). The finance ministry had, in 
effect, made an important concession to La Poste by assuming a large new financial liability in 
guaranteeing future retirement obligations after La Poste’s one-time payment. 
To the consternation of some of the unions, La Poste began to gradually increase the 
number of contractual employees it hired. This enabled the organization to decrease the number 
of civil service positions as departing civil servants would increasingly be replaced by 
contractual employees (Guiomard 1998, La Poste manager 2012a). By the beginning of the 
following decade, La Poste would stop hiring civil servants (Montaigne 2004). 
Cohabitation at the political level would also mean the president of La Poste (Claude 
Bourmaud) would in practical terms share the position with Martin Vial (who became the 
director of the postal services). Vial was seen as close to the Socialists; he replaced a previous 
postal services director (Claude Viet) who had worked under the conservative Minister Gérard 
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Longuet (1997c). Bourmaud concentrated on increasing the international presence of La Poste 
aboard such as with the purchase of Deutscher Paket Dienst (DPD) in Germany and with an 
agreement with the American giant FedEx to help deliver express shipments (Colomer 1999, 
Lemaître 2000). Management also reorganized the internal structure of the La Poste (Silbert 
1996). Despite these change, the organization was still reeling from the 1995 strikes and saw its 
quality deteriorate (S. 1997a, Queinnec 2000). Management announced a plan to speed up postal 
delivery times with La Poste was increasingly feeling competitive pressures from private 
operators. In the all-important business segment, firms were shifting away from La Poste in 
increasing numbers (Barbier 1997). The Germans, for their part, were far ahead of La Poste in 
preparing for the forthcoming European liberalization of the postal market, which France was 
trying to slow (Le G. 1996b, D. 1996). The period was marked by a high degree of social tension 
between the unions and management; La Poste’s management launched an initiative to solicit 
employee contributions and feedback called “Listen and Exchange” (Leroy 1997). 
La Poste’s management also came under pressure from the government to adjust its 
hiring, another consequence of the political change from a conservative to a left-right 
cohabitation government. Christian Pierret was nominated industry minister. Upon arrival at the 
ministry, he criticized the “bad social climate” at La Poste and pushed it to hire 2,500 workers 
under the government’s young employment program (1997b, n.p., 1997a). The minister wanted 
thousands more new young workers hired by 1998 and he announced that La Poste should 
become a public service “in an entrepreneurial spirit” (Lemaître and Stern 1997, n.p.). In the 
meantime, however, La Poste’s financial balance sheet was deteriorating. The Senate released 
two key (and alarming) reports entitled “Save the Post Office” whose author Gérard Larcher felt 
the post office “could die” in the face of competition (1997d, S. 1997b, 17, Silbert 1999b). 
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Moreover, the public services that La Poste needed to maintain on behalf of the state (delivery of 
newspapers, a robust rural network, and passbook savings accounts) proved costly and 
burdensome for the business (Bridier, Colomer, and Dupuy 1999). 
The government, however, continued its push to hire more workers at La Poste, which 
now fell under part of the so-called 35 hour work-week program. La Poste was already France’s 
largest employer after the state and would become even bigger: 20,000 new hires for 1999 and 
2000 (Mouloud 1999, Dion 2001). The problem, however, is that these political directives came 
at an inopportune time given La Poste’s struggles to adapt to a new marketplace, balance its 
budget, and improve its service quality. Moreover, the government forced La Poste to self-
finance these new employees that, all in all, led to a dramatic drop in worker productivity (La 
Poste manager 2011a). Top management would change again in December 2000. Martin Vial 
became La Poste’s new president with the government choosing not to renew Claude 
Bourmaud’s term. Vial was viewed as a loyal Socialist in the eyes of the government and he 
appointed replaced several top positions at La Poste with left-leaning managers (Lemaître 2000). 
Although Vial in many ways anticipated the influence of the Internet and the information 
economy (Renault 2000, Silbert 2000), he was unable to stem decline. The financial situation 
was grim. La Poste would be forced to shut down its DPD express subsidiary in France, merging 
it with its other operations (Denis 2001). Social tensions were also high with strikes and the CGT 
union protesting what it saw as an insufficient number of new employees at La Poste (Dague 
2000). Senate rapporteur Larcher (2003) was convinced that La Poste needed urgent attention or 
it could face near obsolescence. 
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5.6 STABILITY AND STEADINESS: REFORM UNDER BAILLY 
The surprise elimination of Socialist Lionel Jospin as candidate for president in the first 
round of voting in 2002 left Chirac and the conservatives assured of victory against extreme 
right-wing (Front National) candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen in the second round of voting. 
Conservatives now had the presidency and a majority in the National Assembly. Several years of 
awkward cohabitation between the left and right ended. Although Martin Vial was to have 
originally served a longer term as La Poste president, the government targeted him for dismissal. 
Vial had not only dutifully implemented the Socialists’ 35-hour work-week at La Poste, but he 
had also presided over steep financial losses at the organization and social tensions (with Claude 
Bourmaud, in part). 
Jean-Paul Bailly, the new La Poste president, was plunged into the waters of this broader 
political and economic environment in 2002. Coupled with the organizational decline at La Poste 
and the instability from the revolving door of leaders over the past decade, Bailly would have no 
shortage of challenges with which to grapple. Bailly was not inexperienced in such matters, 
however. He previously headed the difficult-to-govern (and strike-prone) Parisian subway 
agency, the Régie autonome des transports parisiens. At the subway agency, he implemented a 
system to help calm social tensions and had enacted important changes at the organization 
(Lemaître 2002a, Le Roux 2007). Also in his favor was his management style that emphasized 
consultation (La Poste manager 2011c). In this climate, he was thus a good choice to succeed the 
more partisan Vial. 
Bailly urgently needed to develop a reorganization and modernization plan at La Poste to 
make up for lost time, as well as negotiate a new services contract with the state. Shortly after his 
arrival, Bailly announced that La Poste’s condition was “fragile and precarious” and he proposed 
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change. In his announcement, he noted that La Poste had fallen far short in modernizing in 
relation to competitors such as the Deutsche Post. Germany’s post office, for example, benefited 
from an 83-strong network of automated sorting centers while La Poste modernized just one or 
two of its 130 centers a year (quoted in Lemaître 2002b, n.p.). Finally, another directive to 
further liberalize the postal market in Europe had passed that would soon increase competitive 
pressures on La Poste (European Parliament and Council of the European Union 2002). 
Bailly first set on reorganizing La Poste’s major divisions by turning them into strategic 
business units reporting to the headquarters. This provided clearer lines of authority and 
accountability for each of the divisions. Moreover, each of the divisions could focus on its own 
strengths. The mail division could focus on mail, for example. Within the divisions, management 
was decentralized and hierarchies were flattened. Where multiple management layers existed, 
Bailly streamlined them to just three: headquarters, regional, and local (La Poste senior executive 
2012). 
Working on aspects of organizational cultural change, Bailly sought to instill in the 
organization’s members his “Three S’s”: “meaning of work” (sens du travail), “teamwork” (sens 
d’équipe), and “customer satisfaction” (satisfaction des clients). He bolstered support of middle 
management to aid implementation. Last, Bailly stressed a results-based culture with emphasis 
on follow-through of tasks (La Poste senior executive 2012). Nonetheless, the change also had its 
downside for the country’s employment rolls as employees were not replaced as positions were 
consolidated or eliminated. Contractual employees, which started to increase in importance for 
La Poste in the 1990s, became standard practice while civil service positions for new employees 
would be phased out (La Poste manager 2012a, Montaigne 2004). 
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At the operational level, the focus was on improving organizational execution of tasks 
while making investments to support efficiency and better organizational functioning. Bailly and 
administrators steered €3 billion into renovations and modernization of mail infrastructure and 
sorting centers, which would become some of the world’s most modern. Other important 
investments were made in marketing (especially expanding direct marketing offerings available 
to commercial customers), developing new and better services for businesses, and diversifying 
services at postal branches. Contracted postal outlets run by local merchants or municipalities 
were enhanced and expanded, allowing La Poste to shutter less-frequented rural branches that 
were expensive to maintain (La Poste senior executive 2012). 
In the post offices, management conducted quality surveys that led to a goal for improved 
service. Branch managers and employees were pushed to facilitate a more welcoming, open, and 
personalized environment for customers that emphasized fast and efficient service. Use of 
automated postal machines was expanded, allowing customers to perform the vast majority of 
transactions without having to wait in line. Branches were also redesigned (La Poste senior 
executive 2012, La Poste manager 2011e). Indeed, customers visiting a post office today will 
notice the boutique-like service stations rather than the lines of postal counters. All of this 
reflects the business-like operational ethos of New Public Management. 
The other main operational change centered on continuing the transformation of the 
financial services, which began under former president La Poste president Yves Cousquer. 
Cousquer had taken interim steps to bolster the financial services by appointing a former 
corporate banker to head the division, but he was blocked from offering a wider array of 
financial products (La Poste project manager 2011). Indeed, the finance ministry had earlier 
stymied Quilès’ effort to expand the post office’s financial services in the 1989 reform, handing 
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a victory to the commercial banking lobby. The result was that La Poste’s financial services were 
losing customers and market share to private institutions (Jublin 1990, Labrouillere 1990, La 
Banque Postale supervisory board member 2012). 
Bailly set on finally obtaining bank status for La Poste, which occurred after careful and 
delicate political maneuvering by Bailly and top administrators. Commercial banks were not 
keen to see La Poste’s limited financial services become a bank that would compete with private 
institutions. They worried that La Poste’s large network, originally built with state funds, would 
unfairly provide a competitive advantage. In addition, a new postal bank would likely be able to 
offer lower cost banking products, undercutting private banks. These concerns were, however, 
downplayed by La Poste’s administrators who argued that La Poste already served the fixed- and 
low- income population that private banks ignored. Indeed, in many small towns and villages, 
the only direct access to financial products is through a postal office since commercial banks did 
not usually see such locales as profitable. La Poste administrators convincingly argued this 
public service mission before the government, sympathetic legislators, and the European 
Commission (La Banque Postale supervisory board member 2012, La Poste senior executive 
2012). In 2006, La Poste was able to change its financial services division into a full-service 
bank offering a panoply of financial products. Since then, La Banque Postale has flourished. 
Importantly for La Poste as a corporate group, the bank’s revenues and profits help compensate 
for the decline in mail volume in the mail division (La Banque Postale supervisory board 
member 2012, La Poste manager 2011e, 2012a, 2011d). 
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5.7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 
In 2010, with the final European Union directive being finalized to fully liberalize the European 
postal market by the next year, La Poste was given the authorization to convert itself to a private 
corporation (société anonoyme) (Barjonet 2010). Although the state would hold 100 percent of 
shares (at least initially), the transformation of the historic post office from a traditional 
bureaucratic administration to a competitive, corporate company closed the chapter on a long 
line of reform attempts. Another sign of La Poste’s maturity as an organization is that Bailly had 
not been forced out by the French government as part of the change of government or as a 
condition for passing the new reform law. In most regards, La Poste had finally overcome its 
major internal and external barriers to change. 
In addition to the success of the postal bank, La Poste can count important improvements 
in on-time deliveries (nearly 88 percent of priority letters arrive at their destination within 
continental France a day after mailing versus 81 percent in 2006) (ARCEP 2013). Moreover, 
automation has reduced the time customers need to wait in line at branches (Government official 
2012a). The organization has become more innovative by, for instance, keeping some branches 
in larger cities open beyond traditional business hours. In addition, La Poste had expanded 
internationally in the 1990s by purchasing DPD, one of the larger regional express delivery 
operators in Europe, and continuing to develop it. This has made La Poste one of the largest 
express operators in Europe (La Poste senior executive 2012). Finally, Bailly has brought long-
needed stability and continuity to the organization. 
At the same time, however, some lingering challenges remain. The number of customer 
complaints sent to La Poste per 10,000 items between 2006 and 20012 items more than doubled, 
indicating underlying issues with service quality (ARCEP 2013). It also indicates that in more 
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traditional parts of the business like mail, change is (and has been) harder to implement (La 
Poste project manager 2011). Changing customer mailing habits will thus be one of the largest 
long-term challenges for the company going forward. Indeed, France’s regulator reports a steady 
decline in all types of correspondence for all postal operators over the past six years (ARCEP 
2013). The state also could decide to sell its ownership in La Poste, thus introducing a greater 
degree of uncertainty for La Poste.9 New shareholders could question La Poste’s strategic 
direction by pushing for the postal bank to be spun-off from the larger group, for instance. 
Although La Poste succeeded in the 1990s of relieving itself of its retirement financing 
burden, it is a large organization with much of its costs fixed in personnel. It is still weighed 
down to an extent, then, by its legacy costs despite having achieved considerable operational 
efficiencies (La Poste manager 2012a). Senior management and Bailly were recently tested by a 
series of middle-management suicides (Lebelle and Hacot 2012), potentially underlining strains 
among a key group of implementers of Bailly’s reforms. Reacting to the tragedies, Bailly named 
his cabinet director ombudsman (Visseyrias 2012). Yet the fact that he chose not to create a 
separate position (she continues to serve as Bailly’s cabinet director, a highly demanding job in 
and of itself) potentially undermines her effectiveness from the start. Finally, the express and 
package delivery business has intensified in recent years due to industry consolidation. Deutsche 
Post’s DHL and others remain nimble and fierce competitors of La Poste in France and across 
Europe. For these reasons, La Poste will need to continually adapt and evolve. 
9 The state manages its La Poste shares with a long-term perspective and grants La Poste management near full 
autonomy in operations and strategy (Government official 2012a). 
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6.0  REFORM OF THE GERMAN POST OFFICE 
Given the German post office’s relative stability and continuity for much of its contemporary 
history, the magnitude of transformation at the institution over the past 25 years is highly 
significant. Put simply, the post office undertook a momentous program of market-based and 
managerial reform that dramatically transformed the institution from a bloated state bureaucracy 
into a large multinational firm. It broadened its activities to encompass logistics, reintegrated 
East German operations, restructured, spun off divisions, corporatized its operations, and phased 
out new civil servants. I examine the changes of the past three decades, beginning with a brief 
overview of developments after World War II, including the troubled East German post office. I 
then move to the ambitious West German push for postal reform at the federal level in the 1980s 
and track the political developments of the first postal reform law. I consider reunification and 
the merger of the two disparate post offices. Finally, I document the profound internal 
organizational and structural changes managers carried out from the 1990s to the present, 
concluding with future prospects. 
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6.1 WORLD WAR II’S LEGACY: POST OFFICE SPLIT AND THE EASTERN 
POST OFFICE’S RELATIONSHIP TO THE SECRET POLICE 
Germany’s post office has deep historical roots. Franz von Taxis in the late 15th century helped 
found the modern postal system under the Habsburg Dynasty. In 1876 during more modern 
times, Chancellor Otto von Bismarck unified regional postal and telegraph services by creating 
the Reichpost10 (Eidenmüller 1991). This was consistent with Bismarck’s desire to unify the 
disparate German Confederation into a German empire; the post office became one unit of 
national cohesion and import. After World War I, however, the Reichpost had to contend with 
serious financial challenges and administrative reshuffling. Nonetheless, it was able to set up the 
country’s first airmail service in conjunction with Deutsche Luft-Reederei (a predecessor to 
Deutsche Lufthansa AG) (Eidenmüller 1991). 
The conditions would not be easier for the Reichpost at the time of the National Socialist 
(Nationalsozialismus) regime’s defeat by the Allied Powers at the Second World War. Indeed, 
the Reichpost’s operations were left in tatters (Steinmetz 1979). The eastern part of Germany 
would eventually become the German Democratic Republic under the control of the Soviet 
Union and officials would found the East German post office (Deutsche Post) (Lotz 2007). In the 
West the occupying powers laid the groundwork for what became the German Federal Republic. 
After the new German constitution was put into place in 1949, the new Bundespost was 
established in 1950 under the Federal Ministry for Postal and Telecommunications Services 
(Steinmetz 1979). 
10 Formally, the Reichs-Post- und Telegraphenverwaltung or “Royal Post and Telegraph Administration” 
(Eidenmüller 1991). 
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This severing of the eastern from the western half of the post office was dramatic: What 
had for many decades served as a unifying institution across Germany was suddenly 
dismembered. Yet the postal division reflected developments across Germany: The country 
become ground zero for a high stakes geopolitical and ideological struggle between the West and 
the Soviet Union, helping usher in the cold war. Despite the geopolitical stakes rooted in an East-
West split, the post office (on both sides) continued to deliver the mail and provide 
telecommunications services; the West’s Bundespost also supplied limited financial services 
(Steinmetz 1979, Lotz 2007). This was, after all, an era before the Internet, faxes, or e-mail; 
citizens and officials alike relied on the post office as a critical channel for communication. 
Similarities between the western and eastern post offices, though, largely ended there. 
The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was known for its totalitarian practices. One 
way GDR authorities repressed the population was through the Ministry of State Security 
(Ministerium für Staatssicherheit), commonly known as the “Stasi.” From its founding in 1949, 
the Stasi would earn a notorious reputation for its repressive acts and control over citizens. This 
especially through its elaborate system of surveillance that not only included a robust 
administrative apparatus, but also through informants and specialized surveillance equipment 
(Dennis 2003). The post office, for its part, was intimately involved in the surveillance as it was 
a key conduit for communications. Many of its administrators worked hand-in-hand with the 
Stasi to help the secret police carry out the security ministry’s mission. Besides the post office’s 
complicity with the secret police, the GDR era also marked a period of operational and 
technological decline for the organization. The full degree to which the GDR’s administration of 
the post office’s eastern operations and infrastructure were allowed to fall into disrepair, 
however, would not become fully apparent until after German reunification in 1990. This was 
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also true for the organization’s relationship to the secret police services (Retired senior executive 
2012a, Deutsche Post manager 2011a, b). 
6.2 WEST GERMANY’S BUNDESPOST, 1950-1988 
In contrast to its Stasi-infiltrated eastern counterpart, West Germany’s Deutsche Bundespost was 
a straight-forward operation. It concentrated on the mail and package delivery, telegraphic and 
telecommunications services, and limited savings products (Steinmetz 1979, Lotz 2007). 
Generally speaking, the Bundespost settled into a relatively uneventful period of stability. It was, 
therefore, fitting that its headquarters would be based in Bonn, the sleepy new capital of the 
Federal Republic that replaced Berlin. The structure was reflective of the classic Weberian (1958 
[1946]) model: formal, rational, hierarchical, and rule-based. The Bundespost was a traditional 
bureaucratic organization with an administrative culture that was risk-adverse and focused on 
task completion; one account described postal administrators as “legalistic,” for example 
(Deutsche Post manager 2011a). 
The Bundespost reflected in many ways the subsequent expansion in the welfare state 
during the country’s so-called economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) and the size of the 
bureaucracy steadily increased. In 1970, the Bundespost was one of Germany’s largest 
organizations employing more than 430,000 workers in its various postal and 
telecommunications services combined (1971b).11 Ten years later, there would be more than 
11 The postal services employed 273,356; telecommunications employed 162,411. 
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455,000 workers employed (1981a). This was in addition to the more than 18,000 post offices 
and facilities, as well as the 18 regional administrations across the country (Lotz 2007). 
Yet although the Bundespost increased in size, it nonetheless struggled to keep up with 
the expanding needs of the population and the economy. Structurally, not much had changed in 
the way things were done from the era of the Reichpost at the early part of the century. The post 
office, in particular, was in need of more capital (4 billion DM in 1966 alone), modernization, 
and greater operational autonomy vis-à-vis the federal government. This was the message from a 
1966 expert commission, which also said that the post office should be run more like a business. 
The post office tried to compensate for its financial deficits with frequent rises in postage fees 
(1966b, 1966a). The price of a letter doubled between 1948 and 1972 with nearly every year 
showing price increases (1973). The post office’s problems were being felt by the public: Not 
only did the rises in postal Gebühren (fees) bring consternation, but others complained about the 
quality of the service. Writing in the Frankfurter Allegmeine newspaper in 1959, for example, 
one commentator (Hamm 1959) lamented the mis-delivered mail and slower delivery. It often 
takes two days to receive mail where it used to only take one, he complained. 
After the commission’s report, Postal Minister Richard Stücklen advanced modernization 
plans that centered particularly on trying to reduce deficits and running the organization in a 
more business-like fashion (1966c). Nonetheless the following decades showed that the post 
office’s situation would not dramatically improve; operational deficits remained high in postal 
services while clients’ postal rates continued to rise. Moreover, the post office’s 
telecommunications division was subsidizing losses on the postal side, creating an unsustainable 
dynamic. As in France, the development of a modern telecommunications sector, as well as the 
industry’s Europeanization and internationalization, would begin to make its presence felt at the 
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post office. Major new investments would be needed to compete in the growing marketplace 
(Retired government official 2012b, Deutsche Post manager 2011a, c). To make matters even 
more challenging, by the late 1970s Germany was experiencing higher inflation and 
unemployment that slowed economic growth (Siebert 2005). 
6.3 CONTEXT FOR CHANGE 
A new minister, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, was appointed to the postal ministry as part of the 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and sister Christian Social Union (CSU) parties’ sweep into 
power in 1982. The CDU minister would bring a new, market-oriented attitude to postal affairs. 
In coalition with the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the CDU/CSU government had different 
views on the public services than their Social Democratic predecessors: namely, they were more 
open to market- and business-oriented solutions (Roberts 2009). The government was thus 
supportive of efforts to decrease the state’s role in the economy while bolstering the private 
sector where it felt it could do a better job. The postal minister himself believed that the state did 
a poor job in managing services that could instead by better handled by private actors. He had 
taken this attitude with regards to a commission he previously chaired on communications and 
broadcasting; now he took it to the post office (Retired government official 2012b). 
On a macro-level, the telecommunications industry and its technology were rapidly 
evolving and so with it, the entire sector. This included deregulation and new competitors 
(Thatcher 1999). The growth in telecommunications would ultimately require the post office to 
spend heavily on new and expensive infrastructure and technology in order to compete with peer 
services in the United States and elsewhere (Retired government official 2012b). The European 
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Communities (EC) would also eventually include telecommunications in a services sector 
liberalization push, which developed in the mid-1980s (Thatcher 1999). The idea was to 
liberalize sectors across member states to create an internal European market (Gilbert 2012). 
Postal services would officially come later in 1992 with the first green discussion paper 
(European Commission 1992). 
The post office’s challenges (service and finances), an evolving telecommunications 
landscape, European liberalization, political ideology, and a difficult economy thus defined the 
period by the early 1980s. These elements would feed into the context for reform at the post 
office. By the mid-1980s, Minister Schwarz-Schilling would make his intensions clear that he 
intended to pursue a dramatic reform of the post office that would split the organization into 
three entities: post office, telecommunications, and banking. In the process, he would also have 
to deal with important opposition from the major trade union. 
6.4 REFORM ENCOUNTERS RESISTANCE 
Shortly after arriving at the ministry, Schwarz-Schilling announced a 1.6 billion DM ($650 
million) investment increase for the post office with the majority allocated to improve 
telecommunications (Carr 1982). The minister felt that fresh investments were urgently needed, 
especially in the new technologies that were emerging (Schwarz-Schilling 1983). He charged 
Professor Eberhard Witte in 1985 with the task of carrying out a comprehensive study on the 
future of telecommunications. Witte had a history of working on postal reform and his 
commission would be long (two years) and comprehensive (dozens of meetings and 
consultations in Germany and abroad) (Lotz 2007). Moreover, the telecommunications industry, 
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keenly aware of the high cost of German telecommunications and its equipment, were pressing 
the government (together with the FDP) for liberalization of the market (Bruce 1987). 
The postal services, for their part, continued to experience deficits (1983b). The minister 
was frustrated with its state of affairs and at various points expressed his disappointment with its 
quality of service or lack of modern managerial techniques (Schwarz-Schilling 1986, Jünemann 
and Thelen 1984). Postage was expensive, having quadrupled since 1960 (1985). The minister 
announced plans to modernize, lower costs, and provide the postal services with more growth 
opportunities, as well as develop a future strategy. Underlining his market orientation, he brought 
in private consultants to help craft these new plans (1984a, 1984b). 
By 1987, various ideas and plans for reform of the post office had been circling around 
the ministry and among government officials. When the Witte Commission’s report was released 
in September, it proved decisive in bringing reform of both telecommunications and postal 
services into the spotlight (Lotz 2007). The postal services and telecommunications services 
were grouped together and the minister felt that it therefore made sense for them to be reformed 
hand-in-hand (Retired government official 2012b). Indeed, it would be difficult to modify the 
status of the telecommunications services without also undertaking an effort to reform the postal 
services. Schwarz-Schilling announced the outlines of his reform in September 1987 that would 
call for the creation of three separate entities centered on the Bundespost’s core operations: 
postal services, telecommunications services, and financial services. Each of the entities would 
become state enterprises, thus gaining autonomy and their own boards. The reform would also 
help the post office conform to emerging EC regulatory policies (1987b, 1989). 
The press portrayed Schwarz-Schilling’s proposal as a “middle ground” between 
privatization and the status quo (Thelen and Tichy 1987). Nonetheless, the proposal was 
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dramatic for an institution with nearly five centuries of history: The post office would be turned 
into a state enterprise while being separated from telecommunications and financial services. 
Politically, Schwarz-Schilling generally had the support of his party for the reform proposal, 
including from the domineering Chancellor Kohl (Retired government official 2012b). 
Reflecting its economically liberal orientation, the smaller FDP was supportive, even calling for 
partial postal privatization (1986). 
The opposition Social Democratic Party expressed skepticism for reform, although most 
of its leaders also felt that changes were needed at the post office to improve its services and 
render it more efficient (1989). In addition, the BDI (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) 
industry group came out strongly in favor of reform (1987c). Structurally, enacting the reform 
would be challenging as the post office was enshrined in the constitution of the Federal Republic 
(Steinmetz 1979). This not only underscored the service’s historical importance, but it meant that 
a constitutional amendment with a super-majority vote in the parliament would be required. 
Although the postal minister had the political support of his party and others, in relation 
to the large union that represented postal and telecommunications civil servants, the story was 
different. The Deutsche Postgewerkschaft (DPG) expressed its disapproval with the new market 
orientation of the ministry’s plans for the post office (1983a). During the run up to reform, the 
heart of the union’s attack centered on opposing what it believed would be privatization and a 
split of the services. The union did not want to see the post office’s services, especially 
telecommunications, oriented to the market and eventually delegated to private enterprise. It 
wanted to improve the organization, but keep the structure. Union leaders in particular feared 
ever-higher postage rates, changes to public services (Daseinsvorsorge), and layoffs. Through a 
concerted action that saw union members distribute 16 million leaflets across Germany, the DPG 
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argued for a “citizen’s” instead of a “corporate” post office (1987a, 1989, Lotz 2007). This, 
combined with their rallying cry to “Protect the Post Office, Save Telecommunications” 
(Deutsche Postgewerkschaft 1987, 1), was simple yet clear. These messages for the union 
encapsulated the government’s ideology and plans for the future of the Bundespost. 
The tension between union leaders and the minister deteriorated with at one point the 
DPG’s leader Kurt van Haaren characterizing Minister Schwarz-Schilling’s plans as a “large 
sham” (1987a). Despite the DPG’s tough opposition and protest of the government’s proposed 
postal reform, however, Schwarz-Schilling and the government succeeded in the end in attaining 
a super-majority of votes to pass the new law. The vote included a significant number of Social 
Democrats who also voted for the changes (Lotz 2007), which underlined the general consensus 
for change. On July 1, 1989, the reform would take effect; it created a special legal entity 
(Sondervermögen) from which essentially three state enterprises (post office, 
telecommunications services, and postal bank) would be formed (Kührlings 1990). 
The creation of the three separate organizations meant that the ministry for postal and 
telecommunications was more of a supervisory body with less control over day-to-day 
operations. It also gave the three organizations far greater autonomy and flexibility to pursue 
individual paths. Schwarz-Schilling’s reform at the post office was dramatic, but his step to 
appoint as head of the new Deutsche Bundespost Postdienst Klaus Zumwinkel, a former partner 
at the McKinsey and Company consultancy, indicated that change there was only beginning. 
Three of the six new division directors would also come from the private sector (Lotz 2007). 
Shortly after reform, however, the post office would have to deal with an unexpected 
development that would complicate the modernization task: dissolution of the German 
Democratic Republic and reunification of East and West Germany. 
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6.5 REUNIFICATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE STASI 
The quick succession of the Berlin Wall’s fall in 1989 and the German Democratic Republic’s 
dissolution in 1990 altered the post office’s path to change. Indeed, the official presses in the 
West’s Federal Republic hardly had the chance to cool down from printing revised versions of 
the new postal law when officials pondered additional reform. Leaders at the ministry and 
Bundespost Postdienst would come to believe that a second reform would be needed sooner 
rather than later (Retired senior executive 2012a). After all, the reform completed just two years 
prior had not taken into account the possibility of reunification; although additional reform and 
privatization in the future was projected, reunification now opened a window for further reform 
sooner than planned. This would come in a reform that would eventually lead to privatization of 
the post office. 
Before the specifics of a new change to the status of the post office could be considered, 
however, postal managers and ministry officials in the meantime would have to consider the 
GDR’s abrupt end. West German postal managers now faced the need to modernize and 
integrate a dilapidated postal system in the East, as well as coming to grips with a radically 
different organizational culture. The eastern post office’s systems, procedures, infrastructure, and 
services were antiquated—far below the standards of its West German counterpart. To bring the 
GDR’s Deutsche Post up to a minimum level of (Western) standards, they would have to 
dispense with GDR-era technology and rebuild anew (Deutsche Post manager 2011a, Retired 
senior executive 2012a). 
The West German management took a strategic (and politically sensitive) decision early 
on to maintain one headquarters in the West to avoid duplicative structures and systems. This 
was in contrast to the Deutsche Bahn (national railway), which was seen as an inefficient 
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arrangement (Retired senior executive 2012a). Yet the headquarters decision was perhaps one of 
the most straight-forward; reorganization of other elements of the eastern post office would be 
far from banal. This was due, as previously mentioned, to the role that the East German secret 
police played at the post office. The eastern Deutsche Post would have to be purged of its Stasi 
collaborators or, at the very least, see them assigned to peripheral tasks. 
Zumwinkel and his management team thus inherited the daunting task of dealing with 
administrators intimately involved in such efforts, some of whom had direct ties to the Ministry 
for State Security. Western administrators did not know, however, the extent of the secret 
police’s infiltration into the post office’s ranks as there was no master list. Administrators 
therefore employed an ad hoc or snowball approach to uncover as many of those with Stasi ties 
as they could. For milder cases, they reassigned employees; those with the most nefarious pasts 
were dismissed. Indeed, West German managers could not get rid of everyone. There was 
already a shortage of managers at the post office since Zumwinkel had sent some of his top 
Bonn-based administrators to the East to take over for brief periods; a complete purging (even if 
theoretically possible) would have left the GDR’s former Deutsche Post too lightly staffed 
(Retired senior executive 2012a, Deutsche Post manager 2011b, a). Eastern employees thus 
continued to offer still-needed competencies and institutional memory. These were critical 
elements needed to reform and provide continuity during a time of unprecedented change. 
6.6 TURNING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR LEADERSHIP 
Klaus Zumwinkel, whom Minister Schwarz-Schilling appointed as the post office’s chief 
administrator in 1989, brought a private sector ethos and mindset to his new task. This was by 
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design: The CDU’s Schwarz-Schilling, Chancellor Kohl, and FDP leaders wanted a private 
sector management team in place at reform. The minister in particular felt that business could do 
a better job at running an enterprise than government. Zumwinkel was not only one of the most 
successful businessmen in the country, but he also was a managing partner at the McKinsey and 
Company consultancy (Retired government official 2012b, Heeg 2003). The prominent 
consultancy provides managers in the public and private sector alike with reform and 
restructuring blueprints, as well as managerial and operational expertise. 
Zumwinkel’s appointment to the post office represented a radical change for an 
institution that had been highly statist and administrative. He would step into a bureaucratic 
managerial environment and culture. The West’s post office was hyper-bureaucratized and 
focused largely on fulfilling standard operating procedures. In the East, the managerial culture 
was even more challenging since it was linked to the official state apparatus. As such, 
Zumwinkel would have to challenge basic assumptions there about how a western organization 
is run—and to operate in absence of an enmeshed party structure. Zumwinkel and the board saw 
their long-term task mission to corporatize and privatize the organization (Retired senior 
executive 2012a).  
The irony of a corporate leader’s appointment to the statist post office was also not likely 
lost on union leaders. Not only was Zumwinkel an outsider, but he embodied the corporate ethos 
the union had been opposing during the reform debate. In addition, half of the internal divisions 
were staffed by individuals from the private sector. Such appointments underlined the 
government’s drive to transform many aspects of the post office into an organization resembling 
one found in the private sector. It was also in keeping with the broader push to implement 
business-like management and managerial structures in the public sector. 
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6.7 MODERNIZATION AND CORPORATIZATION 
One of Zumwinkel’s first jobs was to put into place a more advanced postal code scheme (from 
four to five digits). He and the post office launched a publicity campaign to educate and inform 
citizens and businesses that their postal codes would be changing. The switch-over to the new 
postal codes was necessary, in part, because of reunification: Some cities had duplicate codes 
(1992). Transitioning to new postal codes, however, would constitute a relatively minor 
undertaking when compared to other tasks facing western postal managers. These included 
replacing infrastructure in the East and West, corporatizing the organization, and revamping the 
personnel (civil service) system. 
Reunification and the merging of the West and East German post offices were among the 
most daunting. The former East German post office was not only tainted by the legacy of the 
Ministry of State Security, but it was also dilapidated. It required a vast program of infrastructure 
and systems modernization, as well as a cultural change in its ways of doing things (Retired 
senior executive 2012a). To effect change and to modernize the post office there, Zumwinkel 
pushed his Bonn-based administrators to take short assignments in the East. He incentivized 
them to leave the comfortable Bonn environs by linking future career advancement to the 
assignments. When the administrators (now “managers”) arrived in the East, they quickly 
realized that the existing infrastructure from sorting machines and sorting centers, to post offices 
and delivery vehicles, was antiquated and would have to be scrapped. A bottom-up rebuild of the 
infrastructure would be required to bring it up to modern standards (Deutsche Post manager 
2011a, c, b). 
Yet the former Bundespost in the West also needed updated infrastructure due to 
underinvestment and neglect, even if it wouldn’t require full-scale replacement. A particular 
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need was modern mail sorting centers that could employ fewer staff but sort mail more quickly 
and accurately because of improved technology. Smaller, older centers were therefore 
consolidated into more modern, larger ones. Importantly, the federal government was persuaded 
to give up its historical ownership in the postal network, the post offices, sorting centers, and 
other buildings that it had accumulated over the post office’s history. Many of these locales, 
particularly the sorting centers, were in dense downtown districts of high value from a real estate 
perspective. The post office sold many of the central sorting facilities, using proceeds from their 
sales to help finance new centers in peripheral or suburban locations. Finally, the network of post 
offices was renovated and expanded; franchised outlets were opened, thus increasing the number 
of places to sell stamps and related products; a modern controlling and accounting system was 
put into place; and preparations were taken to prepare for privatization of the organization. In a 
novel development, Deutsche Post laid the groundwork to sell-off post offices themselves, 
eventually only serving as proprietor of one outlet located in the federal parliament (Retired 
senior executive 2012a, Deutsche Post manager 2011a, c, b). 
The federal government’s effective gifting of its historic claim to the post office’s real 
estate portfolio symbolized the generous commitment the government made to the post office in 
political and financial terms. All in all, the post office’s change process benefited from steady 
support during its most dramatic phase of restructuring, the 1990s. The mechanization, very large 
investments in relation to peer services,12 and savvy business decisions would turn the post 
office into a “top-performing and dominant market player” (Campbell 2002, 94). This was in 
direct contrast to France where administrators were generally deprived of necessary funds for 
modernization and investment (Retired senior executive 2011b). 
12 Over one short period (1996-1998), for example, Deutsche Post invested nearly 2 billion DM per year. 
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In addition to investments in infrastructure, management also adopted organizational and 
personnel changes that reflected a business- and NPM-like ethos. At the start of reform, 
managers were systematically assessed across the organization to ensure that they were placed 
where they could be most effective. Departments, divisions, and managerial ranks were also 
streamlined to better reflect the main business lines as hierarchies were flattened. This included 
introducing more flexibility and autonomy for managers (Deutsche Post manager 2011a, 
Deutsche Post board of management member 2011, Retired senior executive 2012a). They were 
thus given more flexibility in their work, but had to meet enumerated performance aims. Put 
bluntly: Traditional Weberian practices were “out” while measurable accountability, 
performance targets, and commensurate pay were “in.” 
Zumwinkel wanted his managers to take on varied assignments. They were encouraged to 
leave the relatively rigid civil service and move to contract-based employment. The result would 
be additional risk for employees, but private sector-style salaries and organizational mobility. 
Managers thus had a choice: remain grandfathered into the civil service (and see advancement 
and pay constrained) or move to contractual employment (and lose job security, but earn more 
and take on more interesting assignments). Many took the latter path (Deutsche Post manager 
2011a, c, b). 
For those who did remain in the civil service ranks, Zumwinkel promised no forced 
redundancies through agreement with the union. Zumwinkel did not, however, promise that 
employees would remain in their same positions; rather, he required that they be reassigned to fit 
the evolving needs of the organization (Retired senior executive 2012a). As a result, managers 
and employees who were used to performing the same job or task for many years would 
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suddenly be faced with learning something entirely different—a challenging prospect for some 
(Deutsche Post manager 2011a, b). 
6.8 SECOND POSTAL REFORM: ‘DEUTSCHE POST AG’ 
A second postal reform was now moving through the political process to convert the post 
office’s special state enterprise status into a full-fledged private corporation. Minister Schwarz-
Schilling stepped down due in 1992 to an unrelated disagreement over the government’s stance 
on the situation in the former Yugoslavia. Wolfgang Bötsch, a member of parliament from the 
Christian Social Union, took the helm of the postal and telecommunications ministry in 1993. 
Despite the change, Bötsch offered continuity as he was committed to Schwarz-Schilling’s 
already-developed plans for a second postal reform. Indeed, most of the groundwork for the 
reform had been laid under Schwarz-Schilling (Retired government official 2012a). The reform 
also required constitutional change (Busse 2001) and the DPG union strongly criticized the 
minster’s plans. The union was especially concerned about privatization of the (until-then) public 
post office and about implications for social cohesion in the country following such a change 
(Lotz 2007). Nonetheless, the momentum had already been set in motion by the initial reform 
plans for further market oriented moves. This was especially true given the government’s 
appointments of a strong private sector management team at the Deutsche Post (Campbell 2002). 
Moreover, postal liberalization was on the agenda of the European Communities that would 
require the post office to operate in an ever-more competitive marketplace (European 
Commission 1992, European Council 1994). 
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Deutsche Bundespost Postdienst became Deutsche Post AG officially on January 1, 1995. 
The former postal, telecommunications, and banking special entities were converted into 
autonomous corporations, Aktiengesellschaften (AGs). The organizations were thus privatized, 
although their ownership would be initially controlled by the German government (Busse 2001, 
Campbell 2002). The change to an AG was another significant milestone in the post office’s 
transformation. 
6.9 INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION AND GROWTH 
Corporatization at the post office continued under the new corporate structure, including further 
reorganization. As the built environment can have a powerful symbolic effect on helping shape 
an organizational culture (Martin 2002), management opened an international architectural 
competition in 1997 to construct what would become the new Deutsche Post AG headquarters 
(Deutsche Post DHL 2009). The result is a glittering, futuristic skyscraper on the banks of the 
Rhine River that resembles more a bank in Germany’s city of finance (Frankfurt) than the central 
administration of a post office. The Post Tower (Figure 1) dominates the river’s plain for many 
miles and is the ninth tallest building in the country, symbolizing Klaus Zumwinkel’s drive to 
shed any bureaucratic pretense. The building thus not only made concrete the corporatization 
process, but it also underlined the post office’s international ambitions, stretching far beyond 
ordinary letter deliveries in Germany. 
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 Figure 1. Post Tower. Photograph courtesy of Deutsche Post AG (2003). 
Becoming a major player in the express and logistics industry became a key part of the 
new Deutsche Post strategy. Internationalization was seen as a way to diversify the post office’s 
business beyond the home market, thus providing a new revenue stream as conventional mail 
volume was peaking. Studies were projecting that businesses and consumers would increasingly 
use other communications methods (faxes and e-mail, for example) rather than sending 
traditional mail. Maintaining traditional mail service would thus become increasingly costly; 
branching out into other business lines could be a way to subsidize and compensate for declines 
in the mail segment (Retired senior executive 2012a). 
The post office embarked on a series of acquisitions, buying up smaller express delivery 
firms in Europe and elsewhere. When the post office added logistics services (integrated pick-up, 
storage, and shipping services), it could sell another valuable service to its customers. The 
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corporate name of the post office changed, as well, becoming “Deutsche Post World Net” 
(Frenkel 2000, Campbell 2002). The re-branding symbolized the post office’s increasingly 
interconnected and international aspirations, replacing the more inward-looking Deutsche Post 
that translates literally to “German Post Office.” As the European Commission pushed to 
liberalize the internal market in postal services, the German government opened more of the 
legally-protected market to competition in 1997, ahead of what was required by Brussels 
(Campbell 2002). This increased domestic competitive pressures, but it also furthered the 
Europeanization and internationalization of the business. 
The most important piece of its international strategy would come to be its investment in 
California-based DHL, as well as Swiss-based Danzas (a logistics company) (Frenkel 2000). 
Zumwinkel built DHL to be worldwide competitor to American express service giants United 
Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express (now FedEx). Zumwinkel wanted DHL to be an 
international leader in logistics and express shipping services (Retired senior executive 2012a). 
Through DHL, Deutsche Post would be able to branch out into highly competitive lines of 
business, take greater risks, and maintain global operations. It could also funnel profits back into 
the umbrella organization as needed. The international division would create additional 
autonomy for Deutsche Post as an agency-like structure within the larger organization. In sum, it 
was a historically unprecedented outgrowth for what had always been a domestic mail service. 
6.10 MANAGEMENT’S OVERREACH: BIG LOSSES PROMPT RETREAT 
By the mid-2000s DHL was Europe’s largest express and parcel firm, it led competitors in the 
Asia-Pacific and emerging markets regions, and it was third-largest for international express in 
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the United States. Revenues from abroad (60 percent of the total) exceeded those in the domestic 
German market and it serviced more than 220 countries and territories. It had started to sell 
shares on the stock market in 2000; by mid-decade, the government’s share of stock in the 
company through its investment arm fell to just 34 percent of all stock shares with the remainder 
of outstanding shares floating (2000, Deutsche Post AG 2006). Nonetheless, the expansion was 
not without significant challenges. 
When Zumwinkel crafted his strategy to take on UPS and Federal Express in their home 
(US) market, he came up against two fierce competitors who were loath to surrender market 
share to a competitor. Deutsche Post World Net invested heavily in the US market, however, 
spending hundreds of millions of euros in an effort to scale up DHL’s business. Investments 
included expensive new hub sorting centers in the Midwest and elsewhere (Retired senior 
executive 2012a). Despite the aggressive push, though, Deutsche Post’s spending spree in the 
United States was not producing gains fast enough. In a letter to shareholders, Zumwinkel wrote 
that the US business housed the company’s “greatest challenges” (Deutsche Post AG 2004, 2). It 
was also operating in an extremely challenging market given the de facto duopoly of the 
American express firms UPS and FedEx. Deutsche Post launched legal action against the two 
express mail giants, accusing them of anti-competitive behavior (Heeg 2003). 
Internationalization of Deutsche Post through the purchase and expansion of DHL 
resulted in a transformed German post office. No longer the insular and bureaucratic Bundespost, 
Deutsche Post World Net had become a gigantic and multinational player in the express and 
logistics markets. The modern skyscraper that replaced the old Bundespost buildings, the “World 
Net” re-branding, the aggressive international expansion, the state-of-the-art technology and 
infrastructure, and a multicultural business were all tangible signs of a changed organization. The 
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developments underscored the cultural shift to a more business-like organization that took place 
over a relatively short period. Although Deutsche Post maintained its traditional mail business in 
Germany, it was no longer the organization’s primary revenue-generator. Deutsche Post had 
become global in character; the emphasis in the future would be less and less on the domestic 
mail business. 
Yet the same strategy that profoundly altered the Deutsche Post’s business and culture 
came at a cost. In some cases, the price was in human terms as some of the postal managers and 
workers who remained during the change process experienced difficulties in adapting to new 
management styles, practices, and work tasks. The pressure to meet performance targets 
constituted a big change that was difficult for some, causing considerable stress and angst 
(Deutsche Post manager 2011b, c, a). The strategy also had great financial cost that was evident 
in the consistent losses at DHL’s US operations and failure to break-even (Milne 2006). Long-
term, Deutsche Post would be unable to sustain the red ink on its balance sheet from the US 
operations. In 2007 alone, the firm had to write down nearly €600 million in losses from the 
region while all other regions improved in their profitability (Deutsche Post AG 2007). With 
DHL floundering in the United States, company funds and energy were being diverted from 
other priorities. Deutsche Post’s leadership in the end underestimated the degree to which UPS 
and FedEx would be able to maintain their grip on the American express mail business. 
Zumwinkel had overreached. 
Klaus Zumwinkel, though, would not be around to decide DHL’s fate in the United 
States. On an early morning in February 2008, police raided Zumwinkel’s home outside of 
Cologne and brought him in for questioning, accusing the postal chief of using an undeclared 
Lichtenstein trust to avoid paying €1 million in taxes (Atkins et al. 2008). As the news made its 
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way through the media, Zumwinkel resigned as Deutsche Post chief executive (Milne and 
Williamson 2008). It was an unfortunate and tough end to Zumwinkel’s 18-year tenure at the 
post office. As the organization’s leader, he had been intimately involved the entire change and 
transformation process. Frank Appel, Zumwinkel’s favorite manager, abruptly became the new 
chief (Siedenbiedel 2008). Appel, though, would have little time to reflect on the departure of his 
mentor: A global economic crisis was looming and DHL’s losses in the United States were still a 
large weight on the balance sheet. 
Appel and Zumwinkel had both worked together at the McKinsey and Company 
consultancy, but Appel brought a lower-profile leadership style to the Deutsche Post than his 
predecessor. He is seen by his peers as “precise” with a “cool intellect” (Siedenbiedel 2008, 44). 
Colleagues also describe him as “cooperative” and more consensus-driven (Deutsche Post 
manager 2011a). This leadership style, however, did not keep Appel from making two tough 
strategic decisions. First, he engineered a sale of Deutsche Post’s banking subsidiary (Postbank) 
to Deutsche Bank shortly before the collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in the 
United States and the ensuing economic fall-out (Wilson 2008). The sale was considered 
prescient (Retired senior executive 2012a). The move returned Deutsche Post to its core 
operations while also helping cash-flow. 
After the Postbank sale, Appel next decided to pull DHL out of domestic express mail 
operations in the United States and offer only international express service there. Given the years 
of widening losses ($1.5 billion in 2008) and the economic crisis, the pressure simply became 
too great for Appel not to have done something dramatic. Deutsche Post shuttered all of the 
company’s 18 ground hubs, reduced its stations from 400 to 100, and fired 14,000 American 
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employees. It was an expensive and painful move—one that forced the company to write-off 
nearly $4 billion in restructuring costs (Wilson and Baer 2008). 
6.11 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE OF DEUTSCHE POST DHL 
In Germany through Deutsche Post, it is now possible to order and pay for postage with a mobile 
phone rather than purchasing paper stamps. In another novelty, Deutsche Post allows catalogs 
and bills to be sent to a digital mailbox. Customers can then decide which (if any) of them they 
want printed and delivered in paper form. Finally, many of its branches now sell an array of 
products resembling small convenience or drug stores rather than traditional post offices 
(Rosenthal 2011). These examples of innovation demonstrate how far the former Bundespost has 
changed and adapted. Time will tell whether these developments will prove successful for the 
company’s bottom-line given the steady decrease in traditional mail volume. Despite the DHL 
debacle in the United States, however, overall Deutsche Post is strongly positioned. The 
purchase and expansion of DHL and related businesses was therefore forward-looking. Today, 
Deutsche Post DHL leads its competitors in express services in all markets except North 
America (Deutsche Post AG 2012). An increasingly globalized and interconnected world is 
likely to continue to create medium-to-long-term opportunities for the company to grow. This 
international side of its business will help secure the company’s prospects as traditional mail 
continues to decline. 
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7.0  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF REFORM THEMES 
As stated previously, this study examines the reforms of the French and German post offices, 
particularly the significant change program that coincided with the New Public Management 
(NPM) reform push of the 1980s and 1990s. This chapter seeks to answer the first part of the 
research question posed in Chapter 1: What were the causes and patterns of change at these post 
offices?13 I examine in more detail here how NPM’s ideas were translated into action within the 
two organizations, looking broadly and comparatively at the elements and themes of change in, 
and across, the cases. These nine themes of reform center on the internationalization of 
telecommunications, financial pressures, new management ideas, entrepreneurial and market 
orientations, personnel management, agencies, internationalization, reunification, and elite 
decision-making. I employ certain aspects of Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) framework to help 
situate these reform themes in context. 
7.1 FRAMING PUBLIC MANAGEMENT REFORM 
Public management reform in practice involves interwoven sets of processes that come together 
to lead to particular outcomes, argue Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011). Reform is best understood 
13 In Chapter 8, I address the consequences of change (that is, the results) at the post offices, as well as the second 
research question as to what the postal reforms can tell us more broadly about administrative reform. 
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when it is seen in light of these larger processes rather than in isolation, they say, and can be 
broken down into major spheres of influence: 
• Socio-economic forces encompassing global economic forces, socio-demographic 
change, and socio-economic policies; 
• Political system including new management ideas, pressure from citizens, and party 
political ideas; 
• Chance events; and 
• Administrative system comprising the contents of the reform package, implementation 
processes, and results achieved (33). 
At the center of all of these is elite decision-making, say Pollitt and Bouckaert. Nonetheless, they 
acknowledge elites may be influenced by many of these factors and change pressures do not 
always need to be of a top-down nature. 
The Pollitt and Bouckaert picture of public management reform is a broad, even all-
encompassing, one. Yet, they say, it is best employed as a heuristic device in order to help 
understand reforms in practice. It is in this spirit that I make reference to it: In order to help 
situate the particular reform experiences of the French and German post offices into the broader 
reform context. Indeed, I noted at the outset that I seek to frame and illuminate the diverse 
causes, patterns, and consequences of reform at the French and German post offices in a 
historical explanatory work (Van Evera 1997). To this end, Pollitt and Bouckaert’s spheres of 
influence can serve as guideposts in situating reform influences at the post offices. 
In analyzing reform at the post offices, I begin with the socio-economic forces in the 
internationalization of telecommunications followed by financial strains (linked to socio-
demographic developments). Next were the new management ideas that were in certain instances 
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prominent in the political sphere, sometimes encouraged by party ideology. In the administrative 
system, such new management ideas were emphasized and then later implemented. The ideas 
that were turned into reform center on creating entrepreneurial and market-oriented 
organizations, moving from civil service systems to personnel management, using agency-like 
structures, and internationalization. Finally, reunification and elite decision-making also marked 
reform experiences in important ways. 
7.1.1 Reform Theme: Internationalization and Europeanization of Telecommunications 
Socio-economic considerations represent the broad, catch-all basket into which a host of 
influences may be placed. These can include larger economic forces such as globalization, 
multinational firms, and international trade (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). The growth and spread 
of the modern telecommunications industry is likely the most potent global economic force that 
had an impact on the reforms of the post offices. It may seem counter-intuitive to begin with the 
spread of telecommunications; nonetheless, the factor appears in several key interviews as one of 
the major reasons reform of the post office was pursued. After all, telecommunications was 
originally intimately linked to the post office, but eventually grew to surpass it in both scale and 
strategic importance. 
The telecommunications industry over just a few decades (1960s-1980s) grew from a 
small service to eventually experience major investments, rapid growth, and later 
internationalization. In a key market, the United States, the break-up of giant American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) helped unleash telecommunications competition 
worldwide. Deregulation also followed in some cases. All of these developments necessitated 
major investments to keep up with the growing demand for phone services, as well as to make 
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the phone more accessible and cost-effective for all. By the late 1980s, telecommunications 
would figure into the liberalization plans of the European Communities (EC) under the single 
market program (Thatcher 1999). The program sought to inject greater dynamism into West 
European economies by liberalizing service sectors including telecommunications (the first 
postal services developments at the EC level came later). 
In France, telecommunications administrators were not only keenly aware of these 
developments, but they felt pressure from them (Retired senior executive 2011a). Thatcher 
(1999) has documented how telecommunications developments abroad left a major mark on how 
French telecommunications would develop. Administrators tried to compete with foreign firms 
and launched strategic ventures into overseas markets. For example, they created separate 
subsidiaries to pursue strategic ventures outside of France such as in Japan (Hennion 1988). The 
problem, however, was that administrators lacked the needed capital to pursue investments in 
technology. The growing feeling among telecommunications administrators was that they needed 
to have greater flexibility to react to international developments. This was, of course, 
exacerbated by the growing cultural divide between postal and telecommunications 
administrators. Finally, various ministers (Galley, Longuet, and Quilès) came to recognize the 
need for greater flexibility for telecommunications; as telecommunications were linked to the 
postal services, the post office would also need to adapt. 
Germany, for its part, also felt the pressure of the telecommunications developments by 
the 1970s and 1980s. The country, like France, would require massive investments in new 
technology and infrastructure to keep up and evolve. This could be more easily borne by the 
private market than by the increasingly strapped state, which by the early 1980s was dealing with 
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higher unemployment. The growing internationalization of the telecommunications marketplace 
was thus an important place to which to turn for funding. 
7.1.2 Reform Theme: Financial Pressures 
Strains on the welfare state also played into reform on both sides of the Rhine River. Concerning 
these broader socio-demographic challenges, industrialized welfare states would begin to feel 
budget pressures from slowing economic growth, increasing expenditures, and declining 
competitiveness from the 1970s on (Caiden 1991, OECD 1995). France saw the so-called 30 
glorious years, the period of rapid economic growth and shared prosperity post-World War II, 
slow in the mid-1970s. Similarly, Germany watched its Wirtschaftswunder (economic miracle) 
eventually fade into history (Siebert 2005). At the European level, the EC launched the single 
market program to help address economic slowdowns in Western Europe.  
At the organizational level, the post offices contributed to these economic strains. 
Roughly coinciding with the larger macro-economic difficulties, the post offices began to 
experience deficits in their postal operations. In Germany, operational deficits became de rigeur 
from the 1960s on; in France, deficits became more frequent in the 1970s. Despite the deficits, 
the post offices sought to keep up with changing times. French officials, for instance, undertook 
the Future of the Post Office Study Group (GRAP) to prepare the postal services for what was to 
come. France also launched a series of other study reports in the following years. In Germany, 
the Bundespost tried to modernize its operations from the 1960s on. Press accounts on the post 
office from those years are littered with announcements from postal officials about the need to 
rationalize the organization. This was in addition to the regular investments that were needed by 
the federal government. 
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Clear, then, from both of the cases was that over the long-term the state would not be able 
to sustain the increasingly frequent deficits. (Telecommunications were often showing 
operational surpluses.) The postal service deficits would thus help contribute to a sense among 
elites that something would eventually need to be done to address the situation. This was 
magnified by the fact that postal services, in both countries, already represented one of the 
largest public expenditures. 
7.1.3 Reform Theme: New Management Ideas 
New management ideas can play a critical role in feeding into the political system, as well as into 
the consciousness of the elite decision-makers who usually decide reforms. In both cases, 
however, it is difficult to establish a direct correlation and the picture is usually fuzzier than 
straight-forward (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). Nevertheless, new management ideas did play a 
role in the reform of the French and German postal services; in important ways, they filtered into 
implementation of reform. Yet before turning to this point I briefly re-cap the managerial trends 
of the past few decades that I highlighted in Chapter 2: 
• Favoring the role of markets and their related reform tools such as making public 
organizations more “entrepreneurial” or business-like, as well as corporatizing or 
privatizing them; 
• Increasing the power of managers by giving them greater flexibility to carry out their 
responsibilities; 
• Emphasizing performance management for personnel and their managers; 
• Creating agencies or agency-like structures; and 
• Depoliticizing the bureaucracy. 
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These trends have been generally grouped under the rubric of NPM and took on an international 
flare when they began to be internationalized in the 1990s. 
In Chapter 2 I also noted how France reflected some of these developments (namely, 
market-inspired reforms such as privatizations) in the 1980s and 1990s, but did not likely 
experience the most authentic NPM until the mid-2000s with the Loi organique des lois de 
finance (Bezes 2010). In Germany, NPM-like changes were generally pursued at the local levels 
of government under the related New Steering Model. At the federal level, officials pursued 
extensive market-based solutions (privatization) in the former German Democratic Republic, but 
most other changes in management practices consisted of bringing the Rechtstaat back to the 
East rather than introducing the latest management trends (Reichard 1997, König 2001). In 
contrast, corporatization was more common at the federal level (in both East and West) with the 
traditionally state-owned firms such as the railways. In the cases of the French and German post 
offices, it appears that market-infused reform ideas (including its related privatization, 
corporatization, or business-like emphases) were one of the reformers’ favorite tools, followed 
by personnel management and using agencies. There were, however, other important themes of 
reform that were not necessarily due to the NPM push. I thus turn now to how these ideas were 
interpreted by the political and administrative systems during the postal reforms. 
7.1.4 Reform Theme: Entrepreneurial and Market-Oriented Organizations 
Beginning with France, several new management ideas stand out in the run up to the major 1989 
reform, as well as in further organizational changes. Of primary note was the idea to create 
“entrepreneurial” public services that would operate in a more business-like fashion. In the late 
1980s, the minister emphasized the approach when he took the reins of the ministry. The ideas, 
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however, go further back with an initiative to transform the post office into more of a 
commercial entity in the early 1970s, as well as a commercial services push in the mid-1980s. 
Telecommunications administrators would also create the international subsidiary (France 
Télécom) while postal administrators would inaugurate express services (Chronopost) to 
compete with private operators, thus underlining commercial orientations. 
In another example of how the French post office demonstrated entrepreneurial affinities 
was when the new corporate head of the financial services was appointed by the first La Poste 
president. This director would transform the basic financial services (which were centered on 
passbook savings accounts) to look more and more like services at commercial bank. Eventually, 
the financial services division would be transformed into a full-fledged bank in 2006. Finally, the 
reform converted the post office from a ministerial structure into two state enterprises 
(établissements publics à caractère industriel et commercial), which by definition emphasized a 
commercial orientation. When the post office became a public corporation (société anonyme), it 
would resemble virtually any other French company under the law although its ownership would 
remain with the state. These initiatives thus not only demonstrated a preference for the market 
and an entrepreneurial orientation, but they also underscored strategic prowess and the further 
effort to carve out organizational autonomy under the then-constrained system. 
The German public sector reformers who took power in the early 1980s during the 
country’s economic downturn were strongly influenced by commercial, entrepreneurial, and 
market-based ideas. The postal minister and the conservative-liberal government had a stronger 
affinity for market-based solutions than the previous government. When the minister turned his 
efforts to the post office, and especially to the telecommunications services, he believed that the 
state was a poor manager of commercial services. Over the following years, he pushed through 
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(with the support of powerful chancellor) a constitutional change that transformed the German 
Bundespost into three separate state enterprises: postal services, telecommunications services, 
and banking services. This intermediate step was then followed by conversion of the post office 
into a corporation (Aktionsgesellschaft) under another constitutional change in 1994 that paved 
the way for privatization of the organization. 
All of these developments underline the period’s market-oriented approach to managing 
the public sector. The full extent of this market and entrepreneurial orientation was made even 
clearer at adoption of the reform in 1989: The minister appointed management from the private 
sector to lead the organization in restructuring. In time, the board and management would have a 
large number of appointees made up of members coming directly from the business community. 
These appointments sent a clear signal not only to the corporate world, but also to postal 
employees and managers as to where the new Deutsche Post would be headed organizationally 
and strategically. It would, in other words, no longer be the sleepy and bureaucratic Bundespost 
of years ago. 
7.1.5 Reform Theme: Civil Service System to Personnel Management 
The second area where reforms appear to parallel new management ideas was personnel 
management. Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) note how difficult it can be to change entrenched 
administrative systems, but both post offices experienced considerable changes in this area. As 
personnel costs are one of the highest expenses at the post offices, it is not surprising that the 
managers there tried different ways of carrying out personnel functions. 
In order to pass reform of the French post office, the minister guaranteed that current 
employees would maintain their civil servant status. In fact, these employees largely benefited 
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from the reform as the consolidated and simplified pay and grade scheme under the new civil 
service structure was advantageous to them: They were often moved into higher scales and 
grades. Nonetheless, this revamping of the civil service was only an intermediate part of the 
reform process. La Poste would begin to hire on a contractual basis like any other French private 
organization, eventually phasing out new civil servants. Additionally (and in keeping with the 
new management ideas), employees would begin to be evaluated against performance metrics. 
This was in an effort to push managers to think differently about their work. In other words, it 
was to push them to be less like task-oriented administrators and to think like goal-driven 
managers. Pay would eventually be linked to such performance; La Poste began to hire managers 
who had been trained in business schools, rather than from more public (administrative) 
backgrounds. 
As in France, German managers at the Deutsche Post implemented wide-ranging reforms 
to personnel management. Administrators grandfathered-in existing employees to the civil 
service system in order to ensure continuity from the old to the new system. Nevertheless, 
leaders at the Deutsche Post gave managers a choice as to whether they wanted to stay in the 
current system or not. If employees chose to remain in the civil service, their salaries and 
opportunities for promotion would plateau. On the other hand, if managers accepted new 
responsibilities, challenges, and additional risk, their remuneration would closely match that of 
the private sector. Moreover, the managers would also be more likely to receive more interesting 
work assignments. 
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7.1.6 Reform Theme: Agencies and Agency-Like Structures 
The use of agencies and agency-like structures was an important part of reform efforts at the post 
offices. Most broadly, the creation of French and German postal state enterprises 
(corporatization) was reflective of this phenomenon. Yet the various subsidiaries and divisions 
within the organizations were also important parts of the reforms at the post offices. These 
structures enabled the post offices to work around some of the constraints imposed by the civil 
service system, as well as those constraints in raising capital. At the French post office, three 
developments used agency-like structures to reform. First of note was the creation of a subsidiary 
in the mid-1980s called Chronopost, an express package mail business in France and Europe. 
The start-up was important to the post office for two main reasons: First, it allowed the post 
office to compete with private operators for business customers in the express mail division. 
Secondly, it could hire employees outside of the civil service to staff its operations while relying 
on the main post office for administrators (who would then take leaves from headquarters to 
manage it). Later in the 1990s and 2000s, La Poste would make other strategic acquisitions such 
as of Deutscher Paket Dienst (DPD) that would bolster these services, further enabling La Poste 
to be a player in the European market. 
In addition to Chronopost (and more important to its future), La Poste transformed its 
once-limited financial services into a full-fledged bank. Technically, the bank operates as one of 
La Poste’s divisions, but it is essentially a company within a company with its own extensive 
management team and headquarters. As such, it may be considered agency-like in stature. For La 
Poste, the bank is strategically important as it can leverage La Poste’s extensive branch network, 
its clientele base, and the “Poste” brand to sell banking products. Moreover, these products are 
often less expensive than the main commercial operators; they also serve customers who can be 
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sometimes excluded by these same operators. The French postal bank (La Banque Postale) 
provides growth opportunities, as well as needed revenues to help compensate for the declining 
mainline mail business. In addition, it helps pay for the expensive brick-and-mortar postal 
branches, although it remains an open question as to whether true synergies exist between the 
two spheres. 
At Deutsche Post, the agency strategy was critical to the organization’s reform and to its 
future. In order to pursue this track, Deutsche Post purchased, among other operators, the US-
based DHL express mail firm. The post office would then over the years transform DHL by 
eventually combining it with other operators to create one of the world’s largest express logistics 
firms. The purchases of subsidiaries and their integration into the post office enabled the 
organization to grow. The strategy allowed Deutsche Post to use its DHL division to compensate 
for the decline in traditional domestic mail services while pursuing other income streams and 
lines of business that might be difficult to rationalize as a traditional post office. Moreover, in 
order to support DHL and recruit top managers, Deutsche Post relied on contractual employment 
with competitive private sector-level salaries instead of hiring through the civil service. 
7.1.7 Reform Theme: Internationalization 
The Deutsche Post management decided in the mid-1990s that internationalization would be a 
key part of its corporate strategy. It rebranded itself “Deutsche Post World Net” to emphasize its 
global orientation and leveraged DHL to pursue this strategy, investing heavily in the business. 
DHL ran into major difficulties with its US operations and had to ultimately exit the American 
domestic market. Despite this DHL accounts today for more revenues than the mainline German 
mail operations and is seen as the core of the post office’s business model, present in more than 
 112 
220 countries and territories. Through ambitious international expansion and buy-outs, Deutsche 
Post’s DHL became a multinational behemoth and the world’s number one express firm in all 
regions except for the Americas. DHL and its international orientation is thus a key prong of the 
company’s business model. At France’s La Poste, through Chronopost and its other subsidiaries, 
the scale is much smaller in terms of internationalization; as such, the organization is not as 
dependent on the international business as is Deutsche Post. 
7.1.8 Reform Theme: Germany’s Reunification 
Chance events are rare, but they can often have an important impact on the shape of public sector 
reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). In the former West Germany, the major constitutional 
reform of 1988 had already been completed, but the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the 
German Democratic Republic would have implications for the implementation of reform in the 
East. This, of course, marks an important contrast with France’s La Poste, which did not have to 
contend with such a daunting, disruptive, and costly one-time event. For the German post office, 
the end of the German Democratic Republic created two dynamics. On the one hand, reform and 
change were temporarily slowed as administrators had to deal with the problem of the Secret 
State Police, as well as rebuilding the entire East German post office. On the other hand, 
administrators received financial support from the federal government to fully renew the postal 
infrastructure there. The end result, then, was a truly state-of-the-art postal service. 
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7.1.9 Reform Theme: Effects of Elite Decision-Making 
As the locus of socio-economic, political system, and administrative system interactions, elite 
decision-making is thus at the center of public management reform (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011). 
At the post offices, the decisions made by elites at particular moments served to move forward or 
encumber reform. Beginning with France, in order to understand the impact elite decision-
making can play on reform, it is helpful to recall a major reform attempt from the early 1970s. At 
that time, postal minister Robert Galley decided to create state enterprises (EPICs) out of the 
postal and telecommunication services. The unions, however, launched massive industrial action 
against the proposal, and defeated it through debilitating strikes that wreaked havoc on the 
country’s mail and package deliveries. The minister was ultimately unable to make the case for 
change; his decision was out-of-step with a seemingly insurmountable union push-back. 
A generation later, French postal minister Gérard Longuet also attempted major reform 
with a move to privatize telecommunications by turning the post office into a state enterprise. 
Longuet attempted to advance a broader privatization agenda under Prime Minister Jacques 
Chirac. The telecommunications industry was rapidly changing and Longuet recognized that 
something needed to be done. The minister, however, made the wrong calculation (privatization 
of telecommunications) for the period and the reform plans (again) fell through. 
The successful 1989 postal reform, on the other hand, benefited from savvy decision-
making by a new postal minister Paul Quilès. After marathon negotiations with the unions ended 
in failure, Quilès initiated a year-long “public consultation” as a way to sell a reform to the 
public. In its broad outlines, the reform that emerged from the exercise did not look that much 
different from proposals that were put forward by the previous ministers in the past: The post 
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office would be transformed into a state enterprise.14 Yet in contrast to former ministers Galley 
and Longuet, this elite decision-maker was good at employing the press to help make his case for 
change by amplifying the post office’s problems. He effectively circumvented the majority of 
union resistance through his public exercise and modified the tone of the reform’s presentation 
so that it would be less threatening. He would also not pursue privatization of 
telecommunications as his immediate predecessor had proposed. Finally, Quilès guaranteed that 
the civil servant status for existing workers would not change (although the civil service corps 
and grades would be reformed). All of the major unions except the Confédération générale du 
travail signed on to the reform plans. 
On the other side of the Rhine River in Germany, the postal minister made a critical and 
highly prescient decision in hiring the first manager of the new Deutsche Post. A key decision 
was made to bring in a leader and management team from the private sector. This team 
reorganized the post office, transforming it into a profitable firm of international import. In the 
top manager (Klaus Zumwinkel) the Deutsche Post had a quintessential entrepreneurial leader 
who was innovative, visionary, and inspiring. In addition, the management team was largely 
backed by political elites (both at the ministerial and government levels) to pursue the postal 
reform strategy. Huge amounts of state investments would be poured into the post office to 
prepare it for a future without massive state subsidies. 
In terms of state support for modernization and investment, La Poste administrators for 
their part looked enviously at their German Deutsche Post counterparts in how managers there 
were able to expand and modernize the post office with generous state funding. In France, such 
investments had to generally be self-financed out of the existing budgets. One newspaper’s 
14 In this way, it would also be susceptible to privatization, an outcome that many of the unions feared. 
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headline captured La Poste’s dilemma well: “grand ambitions, but limited means” (Silbert 
1999a). This meant that strategic acquisitions and investments were of a smaller scale or even 
cost-prohibitive. Lack of adequate funding hampered the organization’s strategy as it had to 
pursue opportunities (such as acquisitions) on a much small scale than the Deutsche Post. 
Finally, not long after La Poste’s formal reform, interference by French political elites 
into the affairs of La Poste during the 1990s created a serious impediment to reform progress. La 
Poste labored under a revolving door of presidents and leaders until late 2002 when Jean-Paul 
Bailly was brought in as president. The politically-driven implementation of the 35-hour work-
week came at a very high cost to La Poste’s balance sheet, plunging it into serious financial and 
operational peril. In short, while Deutsche Post managers benefited from steady support from the 
government for their reform program, French political elites interjected themselves into La 
Poste’s operations by replacing or shuffling its top management team. 
7.2 COMPARING AND CONTRASTING REFORM EXPERIENCES 
In walking through the themes of reform at the French and German post offices, both similarities 
and differences appear in the two cases. Similarities include the pressure from 
telecommunications with its internationalization and Europeanization, as well as financial losses 
on the postal services side. These pushed towards change. The influence of new management 
ideas also infiltrated both cases such as with an entrepreneurial or market-oriented approach to 
reform, as well as in the implementation of a new personnel management regime. Yet 
divergences are also apparent in the decisions taken by elites that had the effect of moving 
German reform further along and faster than in the case of France’s La Poste. Likewise, the use 
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of agency-like subsidiaries was present in both cases but was on a larger scale in the German 
case. Deutsche Post leaders also led a concerted internationalization push where French leaders 
emphasized the creation of a commercial bank as key to sustainability. Finally, elite decision-
makers on the French side often politicized postal operations during the 1990s, which hampered 
its change program. The blending of these multiple reform pressures and influences underscore 
Pollitt and Bouckaert’s (2011) contention that public management change in practice is process-
based and does not occur in isolation. 
7.2.1 Similarities 
The internationalization of telecommunications had a decisive effect on why reform was 
originally pursued in the cases. Initially, telecommunications in both France and Germany 
became increasingly estranged from their postal service counterparts. This manifested itself not 
only in the mentality of administrators and managers, but also in how technology affected how 
work in the organizations was carried out (postal managers were more administratively inclined 
while telecommunications engineers were more project-focused). Added to this divergence was 
the growth in technology and its corresponding need for major financial investments. The 
internationalization of the sector, including deregulation in certain areas of the world and new 
competitive forces, would eventually reach the French and German contexts. Administrators and 
their ministers were keenly aware of these pressures and did not want to see their services left 
behind in what was emerging as a strategically important sector. Moreover, they knew 
telecommunications would continue to require large amounts of funding; the private sector could 
thus help in this regard. 
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Another important similarity between the French and German post office reform 
experiences were the persistent deficits in postal services. This helped move administrators, as 
well as their ministers, to consider alternate ways of structuring the organizations to improve 
their functioning. In the 1970s, for instance, France’s postal minister introduced new managerial 
practices. He also sought to turn the post office into postal and telecommunications state 
enterprises to give the services greater flexibility and independence. During the 1960s and later, 
German postal ministers were constantly forced to raise the infamous postal Gebühren (fees) that 
were already among some of the highest in Europe. Despite this, the postal fee income would not 
(and could not) compensate for the yawning operational deficits in postal operations. This 
slowed investment in modernization as operational costs were often deficit-prone and needed to 
be covered.  
The influence of new management ideas also infiltrated both cases such as with an 
entrepreneurial and market-oriented approach, as well as with personnel management. In the 
early 1980s, Germany’s new political coalition composed of the Christian Democratic Union, 
Christian Social Union, and Free Democratic Party came to favor market-based solutions to the 
post office’s quandary. The government advanced reforms that would eventually lead to 
privatization of the post office and it installed a strong private sector management team early in 
the change process. This management team emphasized an entrepreneurial approach to the post 
office’s operations and strategy, helping to carry out the market-oriented reform program. In 
France, although governments in the 1970s and 1980s changed their political stripes, the basic 
market-oriented reform outline remained from government to government: create a state-owned 
enterprise. This reform would permit corporatization of the organization, allowing it to become 
(in the word’s of then-Postal Minster Paul Quilès) an “entrepreneurial” public service. 
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Both of the French and German cases pursued (on the whole) similar personnel 
management strategies in transitioning away from the civil service system: The post offices 
grandfathered-in existing civil servants, a move that reassured workers who worried about losing 
their civil service protections. Germany’s Deutsche Post moved at a faster pace towards a classic 
(private sector-like) personnel scheme by encouraging its managers to leave the civil service for 
more lucrative pay and higher amounts of responsibility under contract. France’s La Poste 
continued to offer a recruitment concours until the early 2000s, underlining the persistence of its 
administrative system during reform. Nonetheless, today La Poste practices similar personnel 
management as the Deutsche Post by hiring from top graduate and business schools rather than 
through a civil service-organized competitive process. It also substituted contractual-based 
employment for civil service positions at an increasing pace from the mid-1990s on. 
7.2.2 Dissimilarities 
The French and German cases begin to diverge in the way the changes were implemented and in 
how they filtered through the administrative systems. This relates, in part, to the differing 
administrative system contours (structural and union-management relations, for example), as 
well as to the key decisions of elites and their exhibited leadership during reforms. First, a key 
structural difference was in the reform process itself as West German reformers of the 
Bundespost had to contend with changing the constitution on two separate occasions. This was, 
to be sure, a high hurdle as the government had to secure super-majorities in the two houses of 
parliament to enact reform. France’s reform, in contrast, did not require constitutional change 
and it in this sense, was an easier legislative hurdle. Finally, German reformers and Deutsche 
Post managers had to contend with the unique event of reunification. This created an immediate 
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problem for managers of how to deal with the administrative involvement of members of the 
East German state police (Stasi) who were sometimes involved in direct management of postal 
operations. 
Another area related to the administrative system centers on reform implementation and 
union-management relations. With the French reform, strikes were employed on a much more 
frequent basis in France than in Germany to protest changes at the post office. When La Poste 
managers had to deal with frequent strikes and disruptions, they saw their reform momentum 
slow. For example, industrial action in the mid-1990s had key ramifications for profits and 
productivity at La Poste. (This is not to mention how strikes in the 1970s helped defer major 
reform for more than a generation.) German strikes were generally not as frequent or as 
disruptive to operations over the long-term. This divergence in the two experiences highlights 
how administrative systems can play important roles in affecting final reform outputs and 
outcomes. 
Turning now to differences from the effects of elite decision-making, La Poste labored 
under relatively frequent state interventions in its business operations and in its strategy during 
the 1990s. This was through the decisions made at the highest political levels to often replace or 
shuffle La Poste leaders when there was a change of government; to implement the 35-hour 
work-week, even at a very high cost to La Poste’s balance sheet; and in not adequately funding 
modernization of postal infrastructure or investments (as was the case in Germany). The French 
decisions, which were in many cases the opposite of Germany’s, had the effect of slowing La 
Poste’s reform progress. La Poste even went backwards in some instances. Whereas German 
elites at the postal ministry in Bonn chose not to interfere in the business affairs of the Deutsche 
Post, La Poste’s operations were destabilized on multiple occasions. Whereas Deutsche Post 
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benefited from organizational coherence through its stable management team, La Poste’s 
business reached a crisis situation by the early 2000s to the point of the Senate rapporteur for 
postal affairs issuing a dramatic report on La Poste’s state of affairs. La Poste, in his opinion, had 
just one “last chance” to get it right (Larcher 2003). 
These issues relate to another theme of decision-making: leadership. It is clear that on the 
German side that more continuity in the change program existed due to the nearly-unbroken 
management team at the top of the organization. Moreover, good leadership (versus plain 
management) often exhibits creativity (Grint 2010), which was also on display at Deutsche 
Post’s helm in Klaus Zumwinkel. The postal minister appointed Zumwinkel early on in the 
reform process to transform the post office; Zumwinkel was (to use the NPM jargon) in many 
ways a “bureaucratic entrepreneur” (Levin and Sanger 1994, 18). Zumwinkiel developed a clear 
vision for the Deutsche Post and then methodically put into place the strategy. An example of his 
creative solution to the eventual decline in the traditional mail business was the purchase of DHL 
to move the post office primarily into a logistics and express mail firm. This built a more 
sustainable future for the Deutsche Post, although the company did experience problems with the 
strategy in the United States. 
La Poste, to be sure, also had some very capable and intelligent leaders during the period. 
Nonetheless, the organization was in the 1990s unable to leverage this talent effectively to La 
Poste’s benefit. La Poste struggled to carry out reform and change, falling behind by the end of 
the decade. This was due, in part, to political elites demanding change at the top of La Poste’s 
management when there were changes in government at the national level. Consequently, it 
could be expected that continuity in reform would be disrupted as each new leader arrived. Each 
leader would emphasize different points of strategy and bring his distinct biases to the table. Yet 
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the problem also had to do with the inability overall of La Poste’s leaders to create a strong and 
unifying vision for the future of the organization, attain the requisite buy-in from managers and 
employees, and effectively implement the difficult change that was necessary to solve La Poste’s 
travails. La Poste’s climate was also marred by social tension throughout the latter half of the 
1990s through the early 2000s. 
Moving on (briefly) to other differences in the reform experiences, the Germans 
employed agency-like structures with subsidiaries (most prominently, DHL) to great advantage 
in order to create new opportunities. This worked not only for their employees and the state 
(which would no longer have to subsidize the organization), but it also created a sustainable 
business model for the long-term. In France, La Poste had to use its own limited capital to try to 
scale up its independent Chronopost express division, but its efforts in the 1990s were hampered 
by a lack funding and support from decision-makers. Finally, while Deutsche Post leaders led a 
concerted internationalization effort, French postal leaders saw a full-fledged commercial bank 
(La Banque Postale) as key to La Poste’s future. Deutsche Post on the other hand bought in the 
1990s and then sold off the postal bank a decade later. By the end of the 2000s Deutsche Post’s 
leadership decided to focus on its major competencies, which did not include banking. 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I outlined how various themes entered and contributed to the contours of the 
French and German post office reform experiences. Using certain aspects of Pollitt and 
Bouckaert’s (2011) model of public management reform as a guidepost, I began with the broader 
socio-economic pressures that had an impact on reform (internationalization and Europeanization 
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of telecommunications and financial pressures), followed by examining elements of the political 
system (new management ideas). I then turned to the administrative system (entrepreneurial and 
market-orientation, personnel management, agencies, internationalization, and reunification) 
before concluding with the role that particular elite decision-makers made on reform trajectories. 
The result of this exercise underscores the complexity of the two reforms, as well as how the 
various elements of influence combine and interact to produce particular reform outputs that are 
both similar in some ways and different in others. In the next and final chapter, I will discuss the 
broader results and implications of these reforms. 
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8.0  CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
This chapter summarizes the study and offers implications from the reforms of the French and 
German post offices that were developed in the preceding chapter. The major reform themes at 
the post offices centered on the internationalization and Europeanization of telecommunications, 
financial pressures, new management ideas, entrepreneurial and market orientations, personnel 
management, agency-like structures, internationalization, reunification, and elite decision-
making. I thus seek here to shed some light on the second prong of the research question that I 
posed at the outset of the study: What do the reform experiences of these post offices tell us more 
broadly about reform? The answer for successful reform practice centers on the dual need for 
effective structural change and effective agency. I conclude with some speculation about what 
the French and German cases could mean for a post office such as the United Kingdom’s Royal 
Mail. The postal service will likely be soon privatized in the country, which has traditionally 
been an enthusiastic adopter of New Public Management (NPM). 
8.1 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY 
By the 1980s the French and German post offices faced an uncertain future: persistent financial 
deficits, needed investment in telecommunications infrastructure, and changing societal 
expectations and demographics. At the same time a NPM public sector reform push was 
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beginning to spread through Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
countries, eventually reaching France and Germany. The NPM emphasis on the market, 
organizational autonomy, managerial power, performance, and depoliticization helped create a 
reform zeitgeist that infused the choice of reform tools and methods at the post offices. Once 
unwieldy and outmoded public bureaucracies, the post offices today are dramatically different 
organizations than at the start of the reform process a couple of decades ago. 
At the outset of this study, I sought to add to our understanding of the public sector 
reform process. More specifically, I wanted to (1) better understand the ways in which the NPM 
zeitgeist and its related influences led to reform and (2) how its ideas were translated into action 
at the French and German post offices. The case selection of the post offices was made not only 
because the organizations are historically significant (their rich and storied pasts make them 
inherently interesting), but more pertinently as they embodied the prototypical traditional 
bureaucracy at which NPM was thrust. Reforms, therefore, can be contrasted to their pre-reform 
state to trace back to provide this type of insight through analysis. Finally, postal services are 
marketizable, making them ideal candidates for NPM’s market-infused approach. They are thus a 
good place to look for the mark of NPM. All of these considerations led me to post two research 
questions: What were the causes and consequences of change at the post office; how can their 
patterns of reform shed light on administrative reform? 
The study’s methodology centers on a comparative case study approach that employs the 
historical explanatory tool of process-tracing. In process-tracing, causal processes are mapped in 
order to confirm or reject potential explanations (Bennett 2010) leading to the outcome (here, 
organizations that have undergone reform). Akin to “detective work” (Gerring 2007, 178; see 
also George and Bennett 2005), it offers a rigorous historical analysis that fits well with a study 
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such as this that is “theory-applying” (Van Evera 1997). I used a non-random, purposive sample 
(complemented by snowball sampling) largely made up of current and former members of the 
organizations (usually senior management), in addition to current and former government 
officials. Instrumentation consisted of a semi-structured questionnaire. Data collection focused 
primarily on the three dozen interviews, followed by written primary and secondary source 
documentation consisting of newspaper reports, corporate documents, and archival materials. I 
employed triangulation (Hartley 2004) wherever possible to cross-check data across multiple 
sources to ensure accuracy and validity. 
Pollitt and Bouckaert (2011) note public management reform is, in practice, a 
complicated mix of reform influences and pressures. The findings of this study, nine reform 
themes, underscore this point and how NPM was translated into change at the post offices. First, 
the internationalization and Europeanization of telecommunications, as well as (2) financial 
pressures from loss-making postal operations, created important socio-economic pressures on 
the post offices (exogenously and endogenously). Both France and Germany felt the increasingly 
strong internationalization and Europeanization of the telecommunications industry. This 
intensified competition in the industry transnationally and necessitated reflection on the part of 
postal administrators and politicians as they would have to finance strategic investments and 
expansion. The postal services’ deficit-prone operations meant that in the long-term, action 
would need to be taken to fix an unsustainable situation. This was especially true in light of 
greater economic strains on state budgets beginning in the 1970s and into the following next 
decades. 
Third, new management ideas would then come to infuse the reform debate in the 1980s 
and 1990s, helping to condition reformers’ change tools of choice. With the formal reforms 
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enacted, the political and administrative systems would begin to see the effects of management 
ideas as they filtered into implementation. Most prominent were the (4) entrepreneurial and 
market-oriented changes: Both the French and German post offices stressed business-like 
cultures, although Deutsche Post saw swifter and more far-reaching implementation in this 
domain. This was due to the government’s own ideological leanings and the strength of a 
leadership team that was infused with individuals with private sector management backgrounds. 
Other ways that new management ideas entered into reform solutions included how (5) 
personnel management began to supersede the civil service and how (6) agencies and agency-
like structures (including subsidiaries and divisions) provided important avenues for growth. In 
the case of La Poste, an express mail division (Chronopost) and a full-fledged bank (La Banque 
Postale) provided the organization with other avenues of growth and business diversification. At 
Deutsche Post, agency-like structures emerged through the aggressive purchase and expansion of 
DHL, the worldwide logistics and express operator. In addition, the transformation of both post 
offices from ministerial structures to state enterprises embodied agency creation as a way to 
reform on a macro level. On the German side, (7) internationalization was a key strategy and 
DHL now exceeds Deutsche Post’s mainline postal revenues (which are in decline). At La Poste, 
internationalization has also been important, but on a smaller scale with Chronopost and other 
subsidiaries. 
A special issue and a divergence for the reform of the German post office was the need to 
cope with the challenging issues posed by the dissolution of the eastern German Democratic 
Republic and (8) reunification. Deutsche Post’s western management had the unique challenge 
of purging secret police collaborators, a task for which they had no precedent or operating 
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procedure upon which to draw. Deutsche Post’s management had to also completely overhaul the 
eastern post office’s infrastructure, which was highly deficient. 
A final notable divergence centered on (9) elite decision-making and the role that such 
decisions affected the reforms at the post offices. Deutsche Post’s reform benefited from greater 
degrees of support for reform (including financial) at the political level while La Poste labored 
under sometimes challenging political meddling in its managerial affairs. More significantly, 
however, was how innovative, patient, and effective leaders (namely, Klaus Zumwinkel) 
provided the necessary continuity and strategic coherence to carry out the massive reform 
process for nearly two decades. La Poste also had capable some leaders, but the 1990s and early 
2000s were marked by too many changes in the management team that had the effect of slowing 
(even reversing) La Poste’s reform progress. Indeed, it would not be until the current president of 
La Poste arrived in late 2002 that necessary organizational changes, which should have come 
sooner in the reform process, were implemented. 
8.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A study of the French and German postal reforms provides the opportunity to reflect more 
abstractly on what these changes mean for reform practice and future research. It is clear from 
these post offices that successful reform entails not only effective implementation of structural 
change, but it also it requires effective agency by reform actors. The importance of structural 
modifications was illustrated most prominently with the split of the postal from 
telecommunications services in both the French and German cases. These separations ultimately 
enabled the two business lines (with increasingly divergent and less compatible paths) to pursue 
 128 
their own autonomous futures. Structural change was also necessary in terms of the various 
internal reorganizations and new personnel management schemes at the organizations. Finally, 
agencies and agency-like structures also provided the La Poste and Deutsche Post with more 
sustainable futures. This came in terms of the larger organizations themselves, but also in the 
form of the postal bank for La Poste and in the form of DHL for Deutsche Post. 
On the other hand, the importance of actors’ agency was also on display during the two 
reform experiences. La Poste, for its part, labored under political elites’ meddling into operations 
and strategic decision-making. The revolving door of leaders there, coupled with uneven follow-
through of reform, left La Poste struggling by the end of the 1990s. Conversely, La Poste’s sole 
leader throughout most of the 2000s would provide the organization with the needed managerial 
and strategic consistency to implement difficult internal changes. In the case of Deutsche Post, a 
coherent management strategy through leadership continuity proved decisive in enabling it to 
radically transform itself into the dominant express firm in most of the world’s regions. Yet the 
role of agency was also solidly apparent through its effective leader and CEO. These examples of 
structure and agency show their complementary nature and how they come together in reform. 
Successful reform, in other words, requires both since it is difficult in practice to divorce one 
from the other. 
Turning briefly to avenues for further research, it is notable that one of the world’s most 
eager adopters of New Public Management (the United Kingdom) has allowed its own postal 
service Royal Mail to decline over the years. A 500 year-old British institution, Royal Mail has 
struggled, especially when it was deprived of profits from a mail monopoly. Among other 
problematic areas, Royal Mail’s competitors were allowed to cherry-pick the profitable business-
to-business segment, leaving the company with less profitable and costly-to-service routes. 
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Royal Mail is also a huge organization with massive personnel costs. The government also failed 
to modernize Royal Mail’s infrastructure and anticipate the growth in package delivery. In recent 
years, however, Royal Mail has been able to turn a profit thanks to a strategic decision by its 
Canadian CEO to emphasize package delivery (O'Connell and Marlow 2012, Groom 2012, 2013, 
Hope 2013). 
Given the recent turnaround, the conservative-liberal governing coalition is now widely 
viewed to be pursuing privatization of the state firm. This comes amid stiff opposition from the 
unions, however, who want it to remain a public entity. If carried out, however, Royal Mail’s 
sale would mark one of the country’s largest sell-offs since the privatizations of former Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher’s government in the 1980s (Hope 2013). As one account pointed 
out, even Lady Thatcher was “not prepared to have the Queen’s head privatized” (quoted in 
Groom 2012, 3). La Poste and Deutsche Post, to be sure, faced similar challenges as Royal Mail 
does today. Administrators there also experienced declining business lines, bloated staffs, and 
infrastructure in great need of modernization. Royal Mail’s reformers and future suitors would 
therefore be wise to heed some of the lessons from their French and German counterparts who 
(on the whole) successfully reformed their post offices. Ironically, if reports in the financial press 
are to be believed, Deutsche Post AG is one possible buyer of the Royal Mail business (Hope 
2013). 
8.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The reforms of the French and German post offices have, in the end, shown NPM’s mark on not-
so-obvious cases. Considered two of the most challenging cases for reform, the French and 
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German post offices carried out changes that left them dramatically different organizations than 
at the start of their reform programs. These reforms saw the organizations adopt, among other 
measures, a new personnel management scheme, expand into other competencies through 
agency-like structures, and use market-infused ideas to change the organizational cultures and 
pursue greater levels of organizational sustainability in the long-term. Throughout the reform 
processes, elites and leaders made key decisions that pushed forward or hindered reform. Indeed, 
both La Poste and Deutsche Post (at different points in their reform processes) illustrate this 
dynamic. The changes and reforms at the French and German post offices underline the dual 
importance of structural and agency considerations for reform practice: both are needed. This 
was true for France’s La Poste and Germany’s Deutsche Post. It is an insight that will likely be 
true for the impending reform and privatization of the UK’s Royal Mail, as well. 
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APPENDIX A 
PERSONS INTERVIEWED 
A.1.1 France 
Assistant director, Ministry of Economics, Finance, and Industry 
Commissionner, Autorité de régulation des communications électroniques et des postes  
Department head 1, Ministry of Economics, Finance, and Industry 
Department head 2, Ministry of Economics, Finance, and Industry 
Deputy head of unit, Ministry of Economics, Finance, and Industry 
Director 1, La Poste 
Director 2, La Poste 
Director 3, La Poste 
Director 4, La Poste 
Director 5, La Poste 
Director 6, La Poste 
Former senior leader, Confédération générale du travail (postal and telecommucications section) 
Manager at La Poste and union representative for  Force ouvrière 
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Manager at La Poste and union representative for Confédération française démocratique du 
travail 
Member, supervisory board, La Banque Postale 
Project manager, La Poste 
Representative, Comité économique et sociale européen 
Retired administrator, La Poste 
Retired director, La Poste 
Retired government official 
Retired senior executive 1, La Poste 
Retired senior executive 2, La Poste 
Retired senior executive 3, La Poste 
Retired senior executive, France Télécom 
Retired senior government official 
Retired senior manager, La Poste 
Senior executive, La Poste 
Senior manager 1, La Poste 
Senior official, Ministry of Economics, Finance, and Industry 
A.1.2 Germany 
Department vice president, Deutsche Post 
Managing director, Deutsche Post 
Member, management board, Deutsche Post 
Retired senior executive, Deutsche Post 
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Retired senior government official 1 
Retired senior government official 2 
Senior manager, Deutsche Post 
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APPENDIX B 
INTERVIEW PROTOCOL 
The core elements of this interview protocol was the same for interviews in the French and 
German postal contexts, although it was on occasions slightly adapted to fit the role of the person 
interviewed. I conducted nearly all of the interviews in either French or German without the 
presence of an interpreter. Finally, the flexibility of the semi-structured format permitted 
clarification and amplification of thoughts even if they had not originally been in the protocol. 
 
B.1.1 Background 
I’d like to begin by talking to you very briefly about your background at La Poste (Deutsche 
Post). 
1. First, when did you join La Poste (Deutsche Post)? What is the position through which 
you entered? What’s your current one? 
2. What is your role in the organization? 
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B.1.2 Reform 
Now I’d like to talk about reform at La Poste (Deutsche Post). 
3. As you know, over the past two decades, La Poste (Deutsche Post) has changed 
considerably. 
a. How would you characterize the most important changes in the process of 
reform? 
b. Why do you think these things happened? 
4. How has La Poste changed the way it assess performance? 
a. In terms of the services it delivers? 
b. In terms of its personnel? 
5. How has the accounting of costs changed? 
6. How has the way in which work is conducted changed? 
7. How would you describe the current organizational culture at La Poste (Deutsche Post)? 
How has it changed? 
B.1.3 Technology 
I’m also interested in talking to you about technology at La Poste (Deutsche Post) in your own 
work and in the services La Poste (Deutsche Post) provides. 
8. Could you tell me how technology has changed this?  
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B.1.4 Administrative System and Traditions 
I have a few more general questions for you. 
9. The first question concerns trade unions. Have unions had an impact on the way La Poste 
has changed? And on the type or timing of reform? 
10. What do you think providing a public service means in the context in services at La Poste 
(Deutsche Post)? What do the employees think about it? How do citizens see it? 
11. How have relations with the state changed the way that services are provided? 
B.1.5 Leadership 
I’d like to know about how leadership has affected change at the organization. 
12. Have there been changes in leadership? How have these changes affected the reform 
process? 
13. I’d like to ask you to describe the typical background of senior leaders or managers in the 
organization. 
14. Has management’s mandate or direction for change been clear to you over the years? 
15. Have leaders motivated you? Have they been inspirational? 
B.1.6 Conclusion 
Finally, I’d like to ask you to think a little about the future. 
16. As you know, in the industrialized world including in France (Germany), the postal 
industry has experienced important structural decline as a result of changing mailing 
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habits and lower volumes of mail over the past years. Considering this, do you see La 
Poste (Deutsche Post) being relevant to citizens and French (German) society in the 
future? 
17. Is there anything you would like to add that we may have missed? 
18. Is there anyone else you could recommend to speak with? 
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